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ABSTRACT
INNOVATE WITHIN PRODUCT LINES OR OUTSIDE OF THEM?
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF CORPORATE INNOVATION IN A CORPORATE
VENTURE MAKERSPACE
Cole Joseph Crider
April 9th, 2019
Organizational forms that firms use for innovating include traditional R&D
departments, corporate venturing, and open innovation. This dissertation examines a new
form for corporate innovation—the corporate venture makerspace. Makerspaces are
“shared production facilities,” and scholars suggest they are environments in which to
create; yet few firms have adopted them as a means to innovate.
This dissertation is an ethnographic study in which I examine why a large
corporation with active R&D centers and limited resources also has a corporate venture
makerspace as a secondary innovation mechanism when both organizations serve the same
overarching function: explorative learning activities intended to generate innovative
products that will increase the parent company’s profitability. Specifically, I ask in what
ways does this organization implement its institutional logics into its organizational design,
and what benefits or drawbacks, if any, result from its design.
The reason why the organization ended up with a traditional R&D department and
a corporate venture makerspace is because the makerspace was supposed to be a means to
achieve more breakthrough innovations, but a historical process unfolded when product
v

successes required increased capabilities and resource spreading, generating increased
pressures to adopt a different logic. Further, when products underperformed, additional
logics, further increasing similarity, were incorporated to avoid future failure.
The study contributes to the discussion of new product development within a
corporate venture, demonstrating both intentional and unintentional ways innovation is
enabled and constrained. The results suggest important practical implications for corporate
venture managers, particularly ways in which initial innovation goals can be replaced when
products succeed or fail.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the 20th century, many U.S. manufacturing firms
experienced newfound pressure from globalization, particularly in consumer products such
as electronics, clothing, and appliances. Asian manufacturers were able to dramatically
reduce the timeline from idea to product, forcing U.S. firms to rethink manufacturing
practices. Whereas U.S. corporations can stifle innovative ideas, sometimes for years,
South Korean companies like Samsung and LG whittle years into months, enabling quick
idea-product cycles. U.S. behemoths respond differently. Some stay their course, lose
market share, and fade into irrelevancy. Others innovate by investing in R&D centers,
buying agile start-ups, or outsourcing innovation through licensing.
Past research emphasizes the importance of innovation (Damanpour &
Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 2) and, more specifically, new product development (NPD) for firm
performance (Karakaya & Kobu, 1994; Robinson, 1990). Corporate innovation is “the
development and use of new ideas or behaviors in organizations. A new idea could be a
new product, service or method of production (technical innovation) or a new market,
organizational structure or administrative system (administrative or organizational
innovation)” (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 271). As a key component of corporate
innovation, scholars contend, “product development is among the essential processes for
success, survival, and renewal of organizations, particularly for firms in either fast-paced
or competitive markets” (S. L. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995, p. 344).
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Central to NPD is effective learning—what is learned, how it is learned, and how
the knowledge learned is utilized (Kiss & Barr, 2017); companies construct processes and
routines to manage the acquisition and dissemination of learned knowledge (Kiss & Barr,
2017). For firms that need to innovate quickly, effective learning is especially critical. In
their research, Kiss and Barr (2017) demonstrate that within turbulent industries, faster
NPD implementation strategies were associated with higher firm performance; firms in
less turbulent industries benefited from slower NPD strategy implementation speed.
In an attempt to become more innovative, one U.S. manufacturing giant, crafted an
unorthodox, entrepreneurial approach to innovation, NPD, and knowledge acquisition—
founding a corporate venture makerspace. The term “makerspace” can refer to everything
from a single 3D printer in a repurposed food truck driving around to different city high
schools to Microsoft’s The Garage, a space with 3D printers, CNC machines, soldering
irons, and Arduino boards. Makerspaces are the most recent iteration of the Do-It-Yourself
(DIY) culture (Anderson, 2012) generated by greater availability and access to advanced
technologies. Barrett and colleagues note, “As the price of the technology associated with
‘making,’ such as the cost of 3D printers, declined (Canessa, Fonda, Zennaro, & Deadline,
2013), it allowed for greater development of maker spaces, and the spaces began to spread
into more locations” (Barrett et al., 2015, p. 2). Although the DIY movement may engender
thoughts of improving existing products, “makers” include a much broader array of
activities: “The term ‘maker’ is a more inclusive concept, referring not only to people who
alter the work of others but also those who produce original work, conceptualizing and
executing a project of their own design” (Aldrich, 2014, p. 2). For the purposes of this
paper, Anderson’s (2012, p. 18) broad definition of makerspaces—“shared production
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facilities”—is adopted. A corporate venture makerspace exists when a firm creates a
makerspace as a distinct new venture subsidiary.
I will call this U.S. manufacturing company, “Products Inc.” Products Inc. employs
more than 10,000 people, generating over $5 billion of annual revenue. Although the
company operates multiple R&D centers, executive leadership created a corporate venture
makerspace, which I give the pseudonym MakerHub. MakerHub’s founding purpose was
to shorten the idea-product cycle by acting as a consumer-facing entity designed to enable
a quicker feedback loop between engineers and consumers. Moreover, founding leadership
envisioned new products being generated through community involvement—in other
words, creating an open makerspace design where anyone might walk in and work on their
own projects or co-create on a MakerHub product. Hence, MakerHub’s mission was to
design, prototype, and sell innovative products by co-creating with the community.
Makerspaces are environments in which to learn and create (Litts, 2015). However,
as a corporate venture makerspace—Product Inc.’s creative attempt to increase its agility
and decrease time from idea to product—MakerHub’s combination of corporate venture
and makerspace faces singular challenges. First, at the time of MakerHub’s founding,
Products Inc. was a public company. Thus, for Products Inc. to fulfill its fiduciary
responsibility to shareholders, it must adequately justify founding a subsidiary whose
primary function is to create and prototype innovative products, products which may or
may not ever be profitable or even sold. Like many corporate ventures, MakerHub is tasked
with being innovative, yet creativity is inherently messy and inefficient (O'Reilly &
Tushman, 2013), opening the door for shareholders to exert pressure on both Products Inc.
and MakerHub to convert MakerHub into something more immediately profitable than a
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creative space for tinkering and uninhibited creativity. Thus, MakerHub is faced with the
daunting challenge of justifying its existence to both parent and shareholders while still
fulfilling its mission of community innovation.
MakerHub’s best strategy for surmounting this task of justifying its existence is
through producing sellable products, thereby alleviating pressure from Products Inc.’s
shareholders. In addition to producing sellable products, MakerHub also justifies its
existence by using its community as a test group for Products Inc., helping determine which
products may be more likely to succeed, subsequently reducing Products Inc.’s overall risk
of launching an innovative product that later fails. And indeed, one of MakerHub’s stated
goals is generating over ten new functional products every year to be sold either through
Products Inc.’s commercial channels or through MakerHub’s own go-to-market strategies.
In addition to the challenge of justifying its existence, MakerHub faces a related
challenge—its combination of three stakeholders: stakeholders associated with Products
Inc. (the parent company), stakeholders associated with MakerHub products (the venture),
and stakeholders associated with MakerHub’s makerspace community (the makerspace).
Research suggests makerspaces are environments where learning and creativity flourish
(Litts, 2015)—thereby satisfying makerspace stakeholders. However, little research
examines makerspaces as an effective means of innovating or increasing shareholder value.
How corporate venture makerspaces are able to meet the needs of venture stakeholders (i.e.
identify and develop novel products and capture market share), corporate parent
stakeholders (i.e. generate profit and innovation), and community stakeholders (i.e. space
to learn and create) is yet unknown.
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A third challenge for MakerHub’s leadership is how best to allocate firm resources
and employees’ time to satisfy each set of stakeholders. As both their consumer community
and “maker” community grow, MakerHub is torn between competing demands, each with
resource requirements. Employees are challenged with deciding which stakeholder groups
to prioritize to. Further complications may arise from split loyalties among MakerHub’s
employees. Although many came from Products Inc., several were hired outside of the
parent company. Consequently, employees’ past experiences and backgrounds could
influence how they interact with each stakeholder community.
MakerHub is unique as I could find no other firms founded as a corporate venture
makerspace and used as a means for new product development. Given the importance of
firms continuously innovating, MakerHub offers an interesting context in which to
understand how MakerHub differentiates itself from Products Inc.’s own R&D Centers,
and consequently, what benefits, if any, MakerHub generates for Products Inc. One aspect
of MakerHub’s intended uniqueness is its makerspace.
Makerspace Research
As noted above, makerspaces are the most recent iteration of the Do-It-Yourself
(DIY) culture (Anderson, 2012), arising from heightened access to more advanced
technologies. Makerspace definitions differ, with primary variation around how inclusive
the term is. For instance, whereas some argue for a focus on engagement with physical
artifacts, others state “makerspaces” encompass hackerspaces, fab labs, and co-working
spaces (Colegrove, 2013). Although “hacking” may conjure notions of illegal activity,
hackerspaces harken back to the label’s initial meaning—the idea of taking something
apart, understanding how it works, and improving on it. Fab labs—short for fabrication
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laboratories—were popularized by the MIT media labs and are environments in which
physical artifacts can be quickly prototyped using machines such as laser cutters and 3D
printers. Co-working spaces are utilized as places for professionals to work and for
entrepreneurs serious about moving their hobby to an actual business (Colegrove, 2013;
van Holm, 2014): “Coworking space is seen as an extension for individuals in hackerspaces
that desire to move from a hobbyist to professional production of an item” (van Holm,
2014, p. 6). Of hackerspaces, fab labs, and co-working spaces, Colegrove (2013) notes,
“the common thread running through each is a focus on making rather than merely
consuming” (p. 3).
Makerspaces are generating substantial interest and attention. The White House
hosted its first Maker Faire in 2014. The International Symposium on Academic
Makerspaces held its first meeting at MIT in 2016. And many books are being published
on makerspaces, emphasizing makerspaces as culturally transformative (Anderson, 2012;
Hatch, 2013), makerspaces as learning environments (Peppler, Halverson, & Kafai,
2016ab), and makerspace how-to books on building and running makerspaces in schools
(Fleming, 2015; Provenzano, 2016). Much of the scholarly makerspace research similarly
emphasizes learning and community within a number of environments, including libraries
(Bowler, 2014), museums (Cavalcanti, 2013), K-12 schools (Oliver, 2016), and
universities (Barrett et al., 2015). However, scholarly research is still relatively scant. Even
among scholarly outlets, many articles heavily rely on popular press books for key insights
(e.g., Hatch, 2013). Burgeoning research, however, helpfully articulates the philosophical
underpinnings of makerspaces, including who interested stakeholders are and the
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subsequent outcomes of makerspaces caused by the combination of environments,
stakeholders, and participants.
In the following articulation of makerspaces, I first discuss the philosophical
underpinnings behind makerspaces, which, in addition to the popular press books, have
driven much excitement among education professionals as a possible means of increasing
learning outcomes and among community leaders as a means of improving science,
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fluency in informal learning environments.
Second, I attempt to create a coherent framework of past research, emphasizing how the
combination of environments, stakeholders, and participants create unique outcomes.
Philosophical Underpinnings of Makerspaces
For the past half century, government funds directed toward education—K-12 and
higher education—escalated, yet educational results remain underwhelming (Hanushek,
1996). Although disagreement exists over effectiveness of total spending (Hedges &
Greenwald, 1996), administrators, educators, and voters agree monies should be spent
intentionally toward programs with measurable outcomes (Lips, Watkins, & Fleming,
2008). Scholars began questioning teaching effectiveness and classroom outcomes, and
during the 1980s, scholars argued for alternative learning approaches. Learning theories
such as experiential learning theory (Kolb, 2014) and constructionism (Harel & Papert,
1991) helped popularize interactive forms of teaching and learning. Rather than the
widespread lecture-style model of teacher imparting information to passive students,
experiential learning promotes student action—a model where students learn through trial
and error, creativity, and acquiring information as they need it. This form of learning has
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garnered positive results from both students and educators, generating increased interest in
other forms of active student learning (Ito & Howe, 2016).
Environments, Stakeholders, and Outcomes
In many ways, the maker movement is antithetical to the structured, routine
memorization of current K-12 curriculum, seeking instead to enable learners to engage
with both technology and material, allowing the resources at hand to dictate what artifacts
emerge. This process-centric approach emphasizes the individual rather than a specific
learning outcome, causing a learner to “create their own goals and constraints and these
evolve as their understanding and materials develop, and because the learners’ activities
are based on their own goals and interests, they are more committed to their activity and
find it to be fun and playful (Petrich, Wilkinson, & Bevan, 2013)” (Lacy, 2016, p. 16).
Individuals within makerspaces can thus design and create according to their own interests.
Consequently, informal learning environments such as museums (Cavalcanti, 2013) and
libraries (Bowler, 2014) have blossomed. Notable examples of museums with makerspaces
include the Exploratorium in San Francisco, New York Hall of Science, and the Children’s
Museum in Pittsburgh. Further, one study found 17% of 162 public libraries sampled host
maker events (Bertot, Real, Lee, McDermott, & Jaeger, 2015).
Government stakeholders at both local and national levels are keenly interested in
the long-term outcomes makerspaces may generate among children. One scholar notes
many hope heightened interaction with makerspaces will lead to increased interest in
STEM fields (Colegrove, 2013). For instance, one study examined how students’ familial
backgrounds and past experiences with technology inform their activities within a
makerspace (D. G. Davis, 2017). Another study examined what middle school students
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from low socio-economic backgrounds created when charged with creating something
targeting social issues (Lahana, 2016).
Although less abundant, research has also examined makerspaces within schools
(Cross, 2017; DeRosa, 2016; Lacy, 2016). Makerspaces within schools face a number of
challenges, including resistance from colleagues unfamiliar with makerspace outcomes:
“Educators outside of the Makerspace have the most trouble understanding the underlying
purpose and pedagogy that supports the Makerspace” (Cross, 2017, p. 139) and trouble
engaging both minority and female students (Lacy, 2016; Lahana, 2016). However,
DeRosa’s (2016) study demonstrates makerspaces can be useful in formal learning
environments. Students’ creativity confidence increased and all other learning outcomes
met or succeeded “traditional objectives, except for expository writing” (DeRosa, 2016, p.
149).
Universities are a second formal environment in which makerspaces are becoming
more prevalent in both the United States (Barrett et al., 2015) and Great Britain (Curry,
2017), particularly within engineering schools. In a recent paper, Barrett and colleagues
(2015) articulate how makerspaces potentially solve a growing problem within engineering
schools. They bemoan many engineers leave universities possessing little experience
working with tangible materials as much of their coursework is digitized (Barrett et al.,
2015). However, makerspaces enable hands-on learning, improving job readiness. In
emphasizing the importance of makerspaces, Barrett et al. (2015, p. 3) write that connecting
theory and practice through physical interaction with materials improves learning
effectiveness: “Physical modeling and prototyping have been shown to increase the
effectiveness and quality of the final design, and both play a key role in the development
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of students by linking the material covered in the classroom to the real world.” Schools are
realizing the benefits of makerspaces. Over 35 of the top 125 U.S. universities have
makerspaces already (Barrett et al., 2015) further supporting the idea that makerspaces
generate useful outcomes for adults as well as children.
Past research demonstrates ways in which makerspaces enable learning (Barrett et
al., 2015; DeRosa, 2016; Lacy, 2016) and creativity (Petrich et al., 2013), while also
recognizing potential constraints (Lacy, 2016; Lahana, 2016), such as stakeholder
resistance (Cross, 2017). Learning and creativity are integral to innovation (Sawyer, 2011),
and the next section discusses how several corporations attempt to foster innovation by
incorporating makerspaces into their firms. I also consider makerspaces as a unique
environment in which to respond to past calls for research that investigate opportunity
development as it unfolds.
Makerspaces and Entrepreneurship
Although makerspaces are received with much enthusiasm in learning motivated
contexts, corporations have been slow to use makerspaces given their inherent
inefficiencies.1 As socially-oriented, creative learning environments, makerspaces are by
nature inefficient, decreasing inherent attractiveness for cost-focused corporations. In his
book, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Christensen contends large, successful corporations feel
pressure to develop low risk products in order to maintain their current success; whereas,
start-ups have little to lose, resulting in higher risk, innovative products. Because of the
unattractiveness of makerspaces to many corporate giants, few corporate makerspaces
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There are several exceptions; tech firms such as Google, Microsoft, Autodesk, and
Northrop Grumman have developed internal makerspaces in efforts to keep employees
engaged and creative.
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exist; therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, little empirical research examines corporate
makerspaces.
On the other hand, entrepreneurship scholars have made recent calls for makerspace
research suggesting they may be environments brimming with interesting insights given
their emphasis on creativity and prototyping (Browder, Aldrich, & Bradley, 2019). Their
enthusiasm surrounds studying pre-firm activities during the idea-to-product process;
generally, entrepreneurs navigating the pre-firm activities are difficult to find and
subsequently difficult to study (Browder et al., 2019; Yang & Aldrich, 2017). Past research
examines the entrepreneurial process through several lenses, including cognition (R. K.
Mitchell et al., 2002; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005) and informational economics (Fiet,
1996, 2007); however, how new venture ideas are fostered and developed is a confounding
problem as most empirical studies rely on entrepreneurs’ memories of past events.
A critical part of the entrepreneurial process is how opportunities are developed.
Although entrepreneurship scholars disagree over the ontological nature of business
opportunities (i.e. discovered, created, or imagined), scholars agree on the importance of
studying the entrepreneurial process—the antecedents of opportunities, the process itself,
and the sociological factors in which those occur (Davidsson, 2016). Opportunity
development is the “process of shaping, discussion, and interpretation, whereby initial
ideas are elaborated, refined, changed, or even discarded…this term represents both a
dynamic, iterative, and a socially embedded view of how entrepreneurial opportunities
reach their final form” (Dimov, 2007, p. 714). Dimov (2007) articulates the importance of
examining opportunity development in light of time, environment, and competing forces:
In order to systematically and rigorously study opportunity development, one needs
to (1) capture its ephemeral beginning and fragile sustenance in order to avoid
11

survival bias, (2) reconcile the positivist and constructivist accounts of the nature
of opportunities, and (3) incorporate the involvement of stakeholders beyond the
individual entrepreneur (Davidsson, 2003; Dutta & Crossan, 2005; Gartner, Carter,
& Hills, 2003). (Dimov, 2007, p. 714)
This study is not of a pre-firm entrepreneur engaging in pre-firm activities; rather, it is of
an entrepreneurial firm engaging in new product innovation—a related activity.
MakerHub’s existence suggests the inefficiencies of a makerspace can be
effectively managed with the demands of corporate shareholders. Thus, partly motivating
the present study is the contention that MakerHub is a viable context in which to study new
product innovations as they come to life while also incorporating a rich understanding of
MakerHub’s three stakeholders: stakeholders associated with Products Inc., stakeholders
associated with MakerHub as a start-up, and stakeholders associated with MakerHub as a
makerspace. Each stakeholder group both enables and constrains how innovation occurs
and manifests. Broadly, the study’s purpose is to understand how MakerHub differentiates
itself from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers and how competing pressures impact its NPD
processes.
Theoretical Framework
Products Inc.’s launching of a corporate venture makerspace is unusual, not only
because most corporations appear to find the project unfeasible, but because Products Inc.
is a giant, and giants think and act like other giants. When an organization participates in a
single institutional logic or combines logics with complementary elements, it tends to look
like other organizations because organizations mimic practices that are perceived to be
legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, if an organization draws on multiple
logics with competing prescriptions, the form that organization takes becomes more
complex.
12

The institutional logics perspective is a meta-theory derived from and critical of
neo-institutional theory. Broadly, neo-institutional theory argues firms tend to act and think
like other firms they perceive as more successful or legitimate, imitating both structure and
practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Friedland and Alford (1991), fathers of the
institutional logics perspective, contested that neo-institutionalism discounted individual
and firm agency, arguing firms and the individuals within enact change—firms within
corporations and industries, and individuals within firms. To explain this enation and
evolution, Friedland and Alford (1991) articulated how structure and agency interact, both
impacting and being impacted by the other. Environmental factors shape firms’ and actors’
decisions (Martin, Currie, Weaver, Finn, & McDonald, 2017; Zhao & Lounsbury, 2016).
Actors and firms shape environments (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, &
Lounsbury, 2012). Thornton and Ocasio (1999) define institutional logics as
Socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values,
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality
(p.804).
Understanding how Products Inc. and MakerHub interact with the environment,
with each other, and with stakeholders to generate innovative products is a difficult task
because each is embedded in layers of historical patterns, which influence each entity’s
self-perception, their perception of each other, and their perception of stakeholders’ needs.
The institutional logics perspective is battle tested (Lounsbury & Beckman, 2015;
Thornton, Ocasio, Greenwood, Oliver, & Suddaby, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012),
generating much enlightening research. The present research seeks to add to past literature
by studying MakerHub—a unique organizational that, on the surface, appears to challenge
traditional assumptions about how corporations can innovate. The grand challenge of
13

explaining how and why organizations behave the way they do is at the heart of the
institutional logics’ perspective. Through examining the existing contradiction that is
MakerHub, this dissertation seeks to further understand how MakerHub innovates in a way
that differentiates itself from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers by attending to the sets of logics
driving both. Therefore, I explore the following two-part research question: In what ways
does MakerHub implement its institutional logics into its organizational design? And what
benefits, if any, is derived from its design?

Intended Contribution
This study contributes to institutional logics, entrepreneurship, and makerspace
literatures in several ways. First, by observing how one corporate giant diverges from
industry norms and pressures, fostering an agile start-up in the form of a corporate venture
makerspace, I respond to recent calls for a bottom-up, micro-level perspective of how
individuals and firms respond to competing institutional logics at multiple levels of
analysis (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). More
specifically, I contribute to the logics literature by articulating how individuals experience
and enact the competing institutional logics inherent within their organization as they
navigate through the NPD process.
Although a few studies examine the micro-processes demonstrating firms’ and
individuals’ responses to competing logics (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012), little is
known about how individuals respond within new ventures. New ventures can experience
rapid change as products succeed or fail, are adapted to consumer feedback, market forces,
or environmental factors. This study provides additional data to the broader conversation
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of how corporate ventures intentionally and unintentionally navigate competing pressures
fostered by product outcomes and diverse stakeholders.
MakerHub’s story contributes to our understanding (of the phenomenon) by
demonstrating how success, necessity, failure, and an exogenous shock may interact to
produce a new ordering of logics that differs from that at founding and more similar to
what is familiar (e.g. Products Inc.’s R&D Centers). In this study, four logics are apparent
within MakerHub and their competing prescriptions are demonstrated through the
negotiations between and actions by employees and management. As MakerHub evolved,
developed capabilities, and increased its bureaucracy, competing prescriptions generated a
reordering of logics. However, all four logics remained as MakerHub continued to satisfy
each of its distinct stakeholder groups.
Second, by studying a corporate venture makerspace intended for creating and fast
prototyping products, I contribute to the entrepreneurship literature on factors impacting
innovation and NPD, thereby responding to scholars’ recent assertion that more
ethnography research is needed in new venture processes. In the fall of 2017,
entrepreneurship scholars assembled at Princeton University to discuss the need for
research of nascent ventures. When I began observing in 2017, MakerHub was a four-yearold enterprise and fit the “nascent venture” label. Moreover, as part of the innovation arm
to a major appliance manufacturer, MakerHub is constantly developing new products—
specifically home appliances—generating new processes, and exploring new go-to-market
strategies, enabling me to observe each of these in real-time. This study provides additional
data to the conversation regarding what types of innovations corporate venture
makerspaces actually generate and the impact open innovation has on their NPD processes.
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Moreover, this study assists in fulfilling the need for more entrepreneurship ethnography
by examining how stakeholders’ actions manifest themselves in both constraining and
enabling ways in product ideation and realization processes.
Third, past makerspace literature demonstrates the importance of intention on
makerspace outcomes, whether that be access to a makerspace for children and the
subsequent learning outcomes (Bowler, 2014; Cavalcanti, 2013; Litts, 2015) or the
importance of interacting with tangible machines, tools, and materials for engineering
students and subsequent job readiness (Barrett et al., 2015). Moreover, recent scholarship
suggests corporate makerspaces may be a means of corporate innovation and
entrepreneurship (Browder et al., 2019). By watching making occur in a corporate venture,
I contribute to these relationships by discovering specific ways in which the makerspace
enables innovation, particularly through “hacking” existing products and providing an
environment conducive to developing new product ideas. Although this study’s
makerspace is on the edges of a large university’s campus in the southern U.S., MakerHub
is neither owned nor operated by the university. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical
study of a wholly-owned subsidiary, corporate venture makerspace. Thus, this study
contributes to current makerspace literature by also examining a new makerspace
environment, subsequently creating a different mix of stakeholders engaged in
MakerHub’s outcomes.
Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is divided into five chapters and appendices. In the present chapter
(chapter 1), I tell the tale of MakerHub, relating the environmental factors which shaped
its founding and the uniqueness of Products Inc.’s strategy in diverging from industry
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norms in spawning MakerHub. Moreover, by highlighting current makerspace literature, I
illustrate MakerHub’s distinctiveness as a rare combination of organizational types—a
corporate venture makerspace. I also articulate the fitness of institutional logics as my
theoretical lens through which I analyze MakerHub, its relationship with Products Inc., and
each of their stakeholders. Further, I feature several of my study’s intended contributions.
In chapter two, I discuss corporate venturing strategies to demonstrate the
singularity of MakerHub as a means of corporate innovation. Moreover, I relate relevant
institutional logics literature, attending specifically to how organizations and individuals
make sense of and respond to complexity. In chapter three, I discuss my research method,
data collection, and justifications for it, including past calls by both entrepreneurship and
institutional logics scholars. Additionally, I express positionality.
In chapter four, I highlight the study’s findings, relating how MakerHub evolved
from its unique founding to functioning similarly to Products Inc.’s R&D Centers as it
launched products (successful and unsuccessful), developed processes and practices, and
encountered unexpected challenges. Moreover, I examine the benefits and drawbacks
MakerHub offers to Products Inc. And in chapter five, I articulate the study’s contributions,
practical implications, areas for future research, and limitations.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, I discuss innovation and how institutional logics is a useful lens by
which to study innovation. I begin in the first section by defining innovation and then
highlighting past corporate innovation strategies. I attempt to demonstrate the various
innovation problems firms experience, attending to innovation adoption versus generation,
balancing exploitation and exploration, and open versus closed innovation strategies.
Corporations navigate these tensions both intentionally and unintentionally, subsequently
impacting innovation outcomes.
In the second section, I introduce the institutional logics perspective, highlighting
the four principles outlined by Thornton and colleagues (2012). Following Thornton et al.
(2012), I ground this discussion in seminal institution theory papers. In the third section, I
describe the evolution of the institutional logics perspective from Friedland and Alford’s
(1991) influential chapter to more recent scholarship and further justify its use as the
guiding lens behind this study. In the fourth section, I discuss institutional complexity,
which has emerged as a major theme within the institutional logics perspective and
functions as the phenomenological centerpiece of my dissertation.
Corporate innovation approaches
Of the 500 companies on Fortune Magazine’s maiden publication in 1955, only
12% remain on the list. Once strongly held beliefs that innovation firmly resides in the test
bed of large companies has been put to rest. Firms must innovate. Scholars warn,
“Organizations operating under the present conditions of global competition, rapid
technological advances, and resource scarcity must innovate in order to grow, to be
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effective, and even to survive. Thus, fostering innovation remains a major challenge for
business executives” (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 270).
Innovation is an ambiguous term applied in many contexts in diverse ways. As
defined earlier, corporate innovation is “the development and use of new ideas or behaviors
in organizations. A new idea could be a new product, service or method of production
(technical innovation) or a new market, organizational structure or administrative system
(administrative or organizational innovation)” (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 271).
How organizations approach the necessity of innovating differs, and some firms are better
suited to acquire innovation rather than develop it internally.
Damanpour and Wischnevsky’s (2006) typology of corporate innovation is a useful
framework. Their typology is a two-by-two matrix, examining high and low levels of a
firm’s innovation adoption and innovation generation (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006).
A firm high in both adoption and generation is labeled an “Innovative Organization.” A
firm high in innovation adoption but low in innovation generation is labeled an
“Innovation-adopting Organization.” A firm low in innovation adoption but high in
innovation generation is labeled an “Innovation-generating Organization.” And a firm low
in both categories is labeled “Non-innovative Organization” (p. 271).
A further point important to delineate is the relationship between the level of
innovation and what type of firm is likely to foster it. For example, in comparing innovation
within large firms with entrepreneurial firms, Damanpour and Wischnevsky (2006)
theorize whereas entrepreneurial firms or corporate ventures will more likely generate
radical innovation, large corporations who will tend to foster incremental innovation
(Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006).
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Corporate Strategies
Whereas corporate innovation is the artifact itself—the innovative product or
process—corporate strategy is the specific mechanism by which that artifact comes about.
Specifically, corporate strategy “refers to types of corporate innovation that represent
different strategic opportunities for firms” (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002,
p. 697). Corporate strategies include internal activities such as R&D spending, and new
product development; and external activities include “acquisition of businesses that
provide new products, processes, or markets” (Hoskisson et al., 2002, p. 697). Many factors
may form firms’ corporate innovation strategies, including top management teams
(Souitaris & Maestro, 2010), competition (Porter, 1979), technology (Bettis & Hitt, 1995),
and environment (R. J. Mitchell, Shepherd, & Sharfman, 2011).
In this section, I discuss different types of corporate innovation strategies. I first
utilize March’s (1991) exploitation-exploration framework to relate the tensions firms
experience as they seek to both exploit current assets and explore innovative opportunities.
I also highlight corporate venturing as a form of exploration. Second, I review the recent
strategy of engaging consumers in the development and creation of products as a means of
capturing creativity developed by the crowd. I examine observed outcomes of open
innovation and contend a corporate venture makerspace may be a useful solution to the
problem of corporate innovation.
Exploitation-Exploration
In his fundamental work, March (1991) stated firms must balance between
exploration and exploitation. Whereas exploitation concerns bettering a firm’s current
processes through efficiency and execution, exploration focuses on “…things captured by
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terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery,
innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71). March contends that firms must do both in order to
ensure current and future success (March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). The
question is how to manage both forms of firm actions as each require firm resources:
As a result, organizations make explicit and implicit choices between the two . . .
Processes for allocating resources between them, therefore, embody intertemporal,
interinstitutional, and interpersonal comparisons, as well as risk preferences. The
difficulties involved in making such comparisons lead to complications in
specifying appropriate trade-offs, and in achieving them. (March, 1991, pp. 71-72)
MakerHub was intentionally founded offsite from Products Inc.’s main facility as a means
of distinguishing MakerHub’s explorative purpose. Moreover, although most MakerHub
employees came from Products Inc., external hires were made, attempting to help foster
cultural distinctions between parent and venture. An additional form of separation between
Products Inc. and MakerHub is that MakerHub is a legal entity—a corporate venture.
One means of explorative learning is corporate venturing (Covin & Miles, 2007).
Covin and Miles (2007) state corporate venturing (CV) “involves entrepreneurial efforts in
which established business organizations invest in and/or create new business
opportunities” (p. 183). In an empirical study of 15 corporations engaged in some form of
corporate venturing, Covin and Miles (2007) find misalignments can occur between firms’
corporate venturing approach and their business strategies, resulting in ineffective value
generating efforts (Covin & Miles, 2007). They find,
Many firms employing CV never achieve nor sustain positive overall results
through their venturing efforts. . . . Moreover, dozens of high-profile technologybased companies . . . have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in new product
development, yet have poor track records in new business development. Thus,
while CV may be recognized as a potentially attractive management practice, it is
not a managerial panacea. (p. 183)
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CVs are mechanisms through which corporations like Products Inc. use to learn and
innovate (Covin & Miles, 2007). However, corporations are starting to utilize other
strategies to innovate. I next turn to a strategy MakerHub was built around: open
innovation.
Open Innovation and a Corporate Venture Makerspace
Open innovation is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of
knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of
innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, 2006b, p. 1). Open innovation skyrocketed into
everyday parlance in the mid-2000s. Piloting its rise was Henry Chesbrough, author of two
well cited books (2003, 2006b) and several papers on the topic (Chesbrough, 2006a, 2012).
Chesbrough’s fundamental claim is that corporations’ former means of innovating—
primarily through R&D spending—may no longer be the best means of innovation
(Chesbrough, 2012).
In contrast to open innovation, Chesbrough (2003) states closed innovation
revolves around firm control: “Companies must generate their own ideas that they would
then develop, manufacture, market, distribute and service themselves” (p. 36). Innovation,
the theory posits, resulted from spending the most on R&D, hiring the best people, and
protecting the ideas produced through intellectual property thus garnering profits from a
first mover advantage (Chesbrough, 2003). However, Chesbrough (2003) highlights
several factors causing firms to rethink closed innovation, stating that among the key
contributors are the increased ability for individuals to move and the availability in venture
capital, enabling employees to take their ideas to potentially more enthusiastic investors if
companies disparaged their inventions.
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In contrast to closed innovation, Chesbrough (2003) describes an open innovation
model as one in which
firms commercialize external (as well as internal) ideas by deploying outside (as
well as in-house) pathways to the market. Specifically, companies can
commercialize internal ideas through channels outside of their current businesses
in order to generate value for the organization. Some vehicles for accomplishing
this include startup companies (which might be financed and staffed with some of
the company’s own personnel) and licensing agreements. In addition, ideas can be
brought inside for commercialization. In other words, the boundary between a firm
and its surrounding environment is more porous, enabling innovation to move
easily between the two. (p. 36-37)
An adjacent part of open innovation is the idea of collaboration. Scholars extol the benefits
of collaboration: “Collaboration can increase the value of creation by expanding the
availability and use of relevant knowledge and other resources. Collaboration has been
shown to reduce risk, speed products to market, decrease the cost of product development
and process improvement and provide access to new markets and technologies”
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Fjeldstad, Snow, Miles, & Lettl, 2012, pp. 734-735).
However, open innovation is not a silver bullet for companies. Birkinshaw,
Bouquet, and Barsoux (2011) warn companies are actually much better at internally
generating innovative ideas than they are at selecting, developing, or diffusing those ideas.
Moreover, they certify, “online tools, open innovation communities and big collaborative
forums all have their limitations. None is always right or always wrong. The best approach
involves careful judgment and a deep understanding of the particular challenges a company
is facing” (Birkinshaw et al., 2011, p. 8). MakerHub engages in open innovation as a means
to create, build, and sell new products; however, finding and engaging with the right kind
of individuals—those who have both the technical expertise and the industry wherewithal
to suggest a viable product—can be challenging as sorting through large quantities of wellmeaning but poorly thought out ideas is time consuming.
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When discussing innovation, scholars often refer to corporations as the innovating
entities, studying innovation at the firm level of analysis. However, it is not the corporation
which actually innovates. Rather, innovation occurs through the dynamic interaction
between factors at the individual, group, firm, field, and environmental levels of analysis.
Entrepreneurship scholars emphasize many individual-level factors such as prior
experience, education, and cognitive variables. Yet such studies rarely examine specific
actions individuals take in response to pressures generated by professional, community, or
corporate logics. To more fully understand how individuals and groups of individuals
innovate, a nuanced understanding of their environment and how they interact—both
individually and collectively—is needed. I next articulate the institutional logics
perspective as a key lens through which to study innovation within MakerHub, a corporate
venture makerspace.
The Four Principles of the Institutional Logics Perspective
In this section, I argue the institutional logics perspective is a suitable lens through
which to study innovation and by which useful insights may be gleaned. I begin by
highlighting its four key axioms: (a) the duality of structure and agency, (b) the material
and symbolic aspects of institutions, (c) the historically contingent nature of institutions,
and (d) the examination of institutions at multiple levels of analysis. Subsequently, I
connect the formation of all four principles with how each inform a discussion on
innovation and organizational design within a corporate venture makerspace.
#1: Duality of structure and agency
A central question institutional theory addresses is why firms behave the way they
do. Much literature discussed this question over the past half-century, and indeed, is still
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central within the institutional logics literature. A confounding problem exists, however,
in explaining firm behavior: To what extent do firm managers control outcomes and to
what extent do environmental or field level factors determine outcomes? Prior to Selznick’s
(2011) seminal work, a dominant assumption in organization research was that firm
managers act rationally and with the primary goal of maximizing shareholder value. If true,
managerial agency would be driven by that singular motivation, and firm structures and
processes would be solely focused on the same goal. However, Selznick (2011) disputes
these assumptions, saying they lack explanatory power and misjudge human behavior. His
empirical work demonstrates organizations have structures and processes which do not
maximize shareholder value (Selznick, 1949, 2011).
To adequately explain firm behavior, and subsequently how firms innovate, an
understanding of diverse motivations and misaligned structures is needed. Selznick argues
a dynamic relationship exists between agency, structure, and the environment, which
causes firm institutionalization. He contends misaligned structures are a combination of
institutionalization and mismanagement which occur over time (Selznick, 1996). As
managerial motives inform firm decisions, structures constrain and enable the buffet of
options available. In Selznick’s work, both arguments for structure and agency are clearly
seen. However, precise mechanisms by which they interact or change are lacking. He does,
however, maintain that managers should actively monitor and shape the relationship
between institutions and firms and that if conflicts arise between those, they should be
resolved (Thornton et al., 2012).
Whereas Selznick gave agency to managers, Meyer and Rowan (1977), asking a
different question—why do firms look similar?—emphasized structure over agency.
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Meyer and Rowan (1977) highlight institutional rules, legitimacy, and isomorphism as
means of explaining organizations’ similarities. They contend organizations conform to
institutional rules as a means of gaining legitimacy, an essential necessary for firm survival
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional rules, they argue, are established primarily by the
state and professions and are made known through myths and symbols. Their arguments
emphasize structure and cultural conformity rather than rational decision making by
managers. Zucker (1977) further solidified Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) arguments by
stating that institutional rules—all socially constructed—generate organizational
conformity because they are recognized as facts (Thornton et al., 2012), demonstrating that
“institutionalization as driven by cognitive processes that lead to taken-for-granted
understandings and behaviors” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 24).
Zucker’s (1977) findings are important for two reasons. First, Zucker (1977)
confirmed that the transmission of culture—a structural element—shapes behavior because
perception of cultural can become rule-like. This argument substantiates a structural
perspective of both managers’ decision making and firm behavior. Second, managers use
cognitive processes—what Zucker sees as an agentic element—in rationalizing why they
adhere to the cultural rules. Rationalization is defined as “theoretical assumptions about
how actors make choices and take social action” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 29). The idea of
rationalization is particularly relevant to the institutional logics perspective and will be
unpacked in greater detail.
Similar to Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) neoinstitutional theory also emphasizes structure over agency. However, they contend a
different mechanism causes firm similarity. They assert isomorphism is driven by an
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organization’s field structure rather than an adherence to culturally driven institutional
rules. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also assume both the state and professions shape
organizational fields and are thus integral in explaining isomorphism. They argue
isomorphism tends to increase under many circumstances, including, but not limited to,
heightened environmental uncertainty, strategic ambiguity, and the number and strength of
ties between firms and professional organizations or governmental agencies (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Thornton et al., 2012). They highlight three types of isomorphism: mimetic,
normative, and coercive. Whereas the first two concern adherence to structural forces,
coercive isomorphism nods to agentive power (Thornton et al., 2012). However, this
agency manifests itself primarily through strong-arm regulation, offering little explanatory
richness to “agentive behavior” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997;
Thornton et al., 2012).
The outcome of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) article was the beginning of neoinstitutional theory. In distinguishing neo-institutional theory from “old” institutional
theory, Selznick (1996) considers the importance of legitimacy: “Legitimacy is seen as an
organizational ‘imperative’ that is both a source of inertia and a summons to justify
particular forms and practices. The justifications encourage institutional mimicry or
mimesis, meaning that the organization is highly sensitive to the cultural environment
within which it lives” (Selznick, 1996, p. 273). However, DiMaggio’s (1988) paper
highlights a fundamental problem within neo-institutional theory: it lacked explanatory
mechanisms showing how institutions are created, reproduced, and dissolved (DiMaggio,
1988; Thornton et al., 2012).
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Attempting to address this problem and building on coercive isomorphism,
DiMaggio (1988) theorizes institutions can be created and changed by institutional
entrepreneurs, individuals who seek to better their own position by changing the “rules of
the game.” They do so by shaping narratives and manipulating cultural symbols (Hardy &
Maguire, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012). DiMaggio (1988) also theorizes that institutions are
reproduced through “socializing new participants,” and delegitimized through
hybridization (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 29).
Although DiMaggio’s (1988) work helps expand institutional explanations,
critiques suggest explanatory power is limited due to the reduced agency granted
individuals and the lack of a deeper articulation of individual motives (Thornton et al.,
2012). Moreover, although institutional entrepreneurship is a mechanism by which
individuals can alter institutions, scholars warn generalizing isolated instances may be
detrimental to constructive theory building (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Further, institutional
entrepreneurship is inadequate to explain the relationship between an idea and the
environment in which that idea emerges (Leca & Naccache, 2006; Thornton et al., 2012).
Expanding on Simon’s (2013) notion of bounded rationality to explain how actors
make choices, March and Olsen’s (2010) work returns to a focus on agency. They articulate
two forms of rationality: logic of instrumentalism and logic of appropriateness. The former
asks, “What are my interests in this situation?” and the latter asks, “What is expected of
me in this situation?” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 30). March and Olsen’s (2010) conception
of rationality is important because it generates further dialog about what external factors
cause and legitimize behavior (Thornton et al., 2012). DiMaggio (1991) expounds on this
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idea: “the meaning of rationality changes with changes in the context of institutional
orders” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 31).
To understand MakerHub’s unique organizational design as well as how, when,
why, and what types of innovations occur within a corporate venture makerspace, both
structure and agency considerations are critical. Without considering structure, an analysis
of innovation processes would be merely regulated to a subset of cognitive variables—
while perhaps enlightening, certainly shallow. Conversely, an analysis solely of structure
characteristics and their subsequent impact on innovation lacks explanatory power. Thus,
the consideration of structure and agency broadens both the scope of activities and potential
interpretations of individual, group, and firm actions.
Understanding the tensions between structure and agency is particularly relevant to
studying corporate venture makerspaces, because established corporations like Products
Inc. tend to experience heightened pressure to conform to industry norms (Greenwood et
al., 2011). On the other hand, as a nimble start-up on the fringes of an industry, theory
would suggest MakerHub may be more immune to structural pressures, enabling increased
agency in its decision-making ability. Such autonomy, however, may be diminished if
Products Inc. artificially imposes institutional conformity on MakerHub. The existence and
extent of such influences within this specific parent-venture relationship will be discussed.
#2: The Material and Symbolic Aspects of Institutions
The second principle of institutional logics understands institutions as both material
and symbolic (Thornton et al., 2012). Thornton et al. (2012) clarify, “by material aspects
of institutions, we refer to structures and practice; by symbolic aspects, we refer to ideation
and meaning, recognizing that the symbolic and the material are intertwined and
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constitutive of one another” (p. 10). An important distinction in the institutional logics
perspective is the idea that material and symbolic elements inform artifacts dependent on
which institutional order(s) drive rationalization (Thornton et al., 2012). Thornton (2004,
p. 12) emphasizes six primary institutional orders: “the market, the corporation, the
professions, the family, the religions, and the state.” Institutional orders contain “...unique
organizing principles, practices, and symbols that influence individual and organizational
behavior” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). Understanding institutional order is critical because
if the referent institutional order changes, the rationalization of individual actors will
change leading to potentially dynamic relationships between actors, symbols, and
materials. Moreover, as new individuals come into the firm and others leave, symbols may
evolve depending on the ebb and flow of actors within the organization and their respective
power. Moreover, cultural norms can generate differences between firms as symbols in one
culture represent different meanings than in others.
Neo-institutional theory acknowledges both the material and symbolic. Indeed,
Selznick (1996) highlights the role of organizational myths and rituals within neoinstitutionalism stating, “The formal structure is institutionalized from without as well as
from within, and it reflects prevailing concepts of how work should be organized. In
postindustrial society, formal structures dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional
environments instead of the demands of their work activities’” (Selznick, 1996, p. 273).
Understanding interactions between the material and symbolic is an important
differentiator of the institutional logics perspective (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). And, the
institutional logics perspective assumes individuals, groups, firms, and industries
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constantly engage with one or more institutional orders, influencing material and symbolic
factors.
Understanding how institutional logics manifest and inform both material and
symbolic aspects of firms is important for a study of MakerHub. Innovation does not occur
in a vacuum or solely in the mind of an individual. Forces constraining, enabling, and
shaping individual, group, and firm actions all have their say on what, when, and how
innovation occurs. Moreover, in watching the process of innovation occur, a framework is
necessary to categorize related ideas, conversations, actions, artifacts, and processes to
make sense of how they came about. At founding, MakerHub embraced both symbolic and
material practices reflective of its unique organizational design. However, as MakerHub
expanded its NPD activities, competing goals and resource constraints necessitated
tradeoffs between practices, resulting in some becoming primarily symbolic.
#3: The Historically Contingent Nature of Institutions
The third principle of the institutional logics perspective shows the importance of
examining firms within historical contexts. Thornton et al. (2012) elaborate, “Any true
picture of social mechanisms must be observed not only across historical time, but also
across multiple levels of analysis to capture the cross-level effects” (Thornton et al., 2012,
p. 13). A strength of institutional logics is that the focus is on understanding the
“…elemental parts of theory—the mechanisms (G. F. Davis & Marquis, 2005) that mediate
between cause and effect and unfold over time” (Gross, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 13).
The internet has transformed how entrepreneurs conduct market research, interact with
consumers, and find new go-to-market strategies. While many sociological theories
incorporate some aspect of historical contingency, management theories tend to emphasize
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them less. Products Inc. was founded in the early 20th century, and many processes reflect
hierarchical management strategies and formal firm-consumer relationships. Although
many MakerHub employees were originally with Products Inc., MakerHub was founded
with a flatter structure intending to generate innovation and increase external engagement
(consumers, makers, etc.).
#4: Examining Institutions at Multiple Levels of Analysis
To understand firm behavior, researchers must examine problems at different levels
of analysis and the mechanisms connecting and influencing each other across levels. The
institutional logics perspective understands action within layers of constraints and
pressures—an individual within an organization, an organization within a field, a field
within a society. Again Thornton et al. (2012) certify, “The metatheory underlying the
institutional logics perspective has grown around the concept of the interinstitutional
system as it assumes that institutions operate at multiple levels of analysis with potential
for cross-level interaction effects” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 14).
This principle is relevant to the current study, as any examination of innovation
within a corporate venture makerspace requires consideration of individual, group, firm,
and field level factors. In the present study, firm, and individual levels are each salient as
MakerHub experiences competing pressures externally (i.e. consumers, maker movement)
and internally (i.e. Products Inc. and managerial decision making), fostering within its
organizational design.
Institutional Logics Perspective
In this section, I highlight several of the key elements within the institutional logics
perspective as it has evolved over the past 27 years. First, I discuss Friedland and Alford’s
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(1991) work and the two subsequent articles that generated additional interest in the
institutional logics perspective among researchers. Second, I note several of the early
institutional logics papers, highlighting key findings and additions to the institutional logics
perspective. Third, I conclude by noting the impact of external factors influencing firm
performance.
Development of the Institutional Logics Perspective
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) conception of institutional logics gained little
following until the late 1990s when two influential articles were published in the American
Journal of Sociology: Haveman and Rao’s (1997) article on the evolution of the thrift
industry from 1865-1928 and Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) article on how the publishing
industry evolved from an editorial logic to a market logic. Haveman and Rao’s (1997)
article, while not explicitly an institutional logics article, was influential as it demonstrated
the impact socially constructed forces have on firms at multiple levels of analysis—social,
field, and firm—and how firms evolved. Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) article focused on
three mechanisms by which logics impact executive power: rules of prevailing logics,
attention of logics, and assumptions of logics. The change in logics caused change in the
determinants of executive succession (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Moreover, their article
also highlights some of the material and symbolic aspects of institutional logics previously
discussed.
The early logics literature primarily focused on the antecedents to and
consequences of field-level change, such as Thornton’s (2002) paper on the publishing
industry and Lounsbury’s (2002) study of the finance industry. Scholars also began using
an institutional perspective to research meso- and micro-level variables such as how
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rhetoric can enact institutional change (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and how individual
identity need not align with an incumbent logic or subsequent logic for change to occur
(Lok, 2010). Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) also examined the relationship between
changes in logics on individual identity. In a fascinating article on French cuisine, their
narrative describes classic French cooking’s displacement by Nuevelle cooking. The
authors find logics form behaviors, in part, through systems which reward conforming
behavior and punish non-conformity, further demonstrating the usefulness of a logics
perspective applied at lower levels of analysis.
Forces Shaping Firm Behavior
Before examining logics at the firm and individual level, a brief description of past
research on macro-level effects is useful. A country’s cultural values and norms moderate
the interaction between logics and firm behavior. For example, Ozen and Akkemik’s
(2012) study demonstrates how logics converge with cultural norms at the nation-state
level. They discuss the impact of nationalist logics on the perception of corporate behavior
as legitimate or illegitimate, arguing legitimacy is gained through aligning corporate goals
with nationalist goals (Özen & Akkemik, 2012, p. 523).
Past research also features the importance of environmental munificence as a
potential moderator between logics and firm behavior. Biniari, Simmons, Monsen, and
Moreno (2015) examine the impact of resource dependence between parent and corporate
venture, and their respective dependence on environmental munificence to predict which
dominate corporate venture logic would be chosen. Relatedly, logics moderate network
factors to shape firms’ ability to innovate and exploit structural holes (Vasudeva, Zaheer,
& Hernandez, 2013).
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This section has concerned general literature within the institutional logics
perspective, demonstrating different applications of the perspective to explain phenomena
at various levels of analysis and the dynamic links between logics and firms. In the next
section, I turn to complexity—how firms engage with contrasting prescriptions between
logics. As articulated, firms make tradeoffs in order to generate or adopt innovation.
Further explanation as to how firms balance tensions between competing logics is needed.
Complexity
A critical research theme within the institutional logics literature is complexity.
Complexity is “the simultaneous operation of different logics that impose contradictory
demands on an organization” (Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016, p. 348). Greenwood and
colleagues (2011, p. 317) state, “Organizations face institutional complexity whenever they
confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics.” Institutional
complexity is important because of both its prevalence within firms (Schildt & Perkmann,
2017) and the unique outcomes complexity can cause for organizations and their members.
First, I review why complexity is difficult to study and the need to understand the
specificity of the logic itself. Second, I discuss organizational filters—organizational
elements that impact how they perceive institutional logics and interact with them. Third,
I focus on how organizations respond to complexity. Fourth, I discuss research studying
the relationships between individuals and complexity.
Complexity Analysis
Institutional complexity is difficult to quantify yet perceptively understandable,
difficult because a logic’s prescription may differ depending on the environment (Biniari
et al., 2015), firm (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Amore, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2017), or
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interpretation of the decision maker in power (Greenwood et al., 2011). Moreover, logics
affect firms in varying degrees. For example, whereas centralized firms within a field
network may face greater pressure to conform to logics’ prescriptions, firms less
centralized in a field face fewer constraining pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Furthermore, a firm may experience heterogeneity within a single logic (Sauermann &
Stephan, 2013) as Jain and Sharma’s (2013) study of India’s telephony sector
demonstrates; they identified three distinct market logics.
Attempting to parse prescriptive elements between two competing logics,
understand the degree to which they differ, and digest the subsequent impact those
disagreements manifest themselves in firm and individual actions is daunting. Indeed, some
scholars acknowledge the conception of an “idealistic logic,” while helpful in analyzing,
lacks descriptive impact (Sauermann & Stephan, 2013), complicating analysis between
logics’ distinct theoretical boundaries. Conversely, the existence of competing logics is
observable and intuitive in organizations like universities and hospitals. Pressure to
conform to professional practices and ethics competes with realizing budgetary needs. To
best articulate relevant research, I heavily incorporate Greenwood et al.’s (2011)
formulation of complexity, following their outline and marking recent adaptions to their
framework.
The manner in which complexity impacts organizations is in part due to the logics’
specificity (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). Highly specified logics have clear prescriptions
for firms, constraining action and quickly punishing non-conforming firms (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). Moreover, the more specified the logics, the more
pressure firms face to dissolve the complexity between logics. For example, two logics
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with highly specific, competing prescriptions of firm behavior must be dissolved for
tension within the firm to be alleviated, forcing firms to choose a dominant logic or create
a hybrid logic (Greenwood et al., 2011). On the other hand, firms with ambiguous
prescriptions have greater ability to innovate practices or structures with less fear of
repercussions for nonconformity (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Organizational Filters
Field Position: Greenwood et al. (2011) discuss the salient factors that filter how
organizations experience and respond to complexity. The first factor discussed herein is
field position (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 334). How centralized a firm is within a field
alters the level of complexity it may experience (Greenwood et al., 2011). Scholars have
argued that those on the edges of a field may experience less pressure to resolve potential
complexity due to either an ignorance of expectations (Kraatz, 1998; Westphal, Gulati, &
Shortell, 1997) or a lack of “social nudging and policing that reaffirms existing practices”
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 341), potentially enabling more innovative behaviors.
Conversely, those in the center of a field may face heightened pressure as visibility brings
demands from competing factions with potentially competing logics (Greenwood et al.,
2011). However, if a firm is big enough, they may be beyond regulatory censure regardless
of how central they are within an industry (Greenwood et al., 2011). Moreover, as
complexity driven tensions increase, large firms may perceive complexity more clearly,
enabling greater agency in how they choose to respond (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Structure: How firms respond to institutionally complex environments is also
informed by individual decision makers within a firm. Similar to Hambrick and Mason’s
(1984) Upper Echelon’s Theory, firms respond to external environments through the
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interpretive lens of those in positions to make decisions. Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 342)
pen, “Institutional pressures do not just enter an organization—they are interpreted, given
meaning and ‘represented’ by occupants of structural positions. It follows that the more
differentiated and thus complex the organization, the greater the likelihood that it will
experience institutional complexity.” In some ways, this concept harkens back to
Selznick’s (2011) emphasis on a manager’s monitoring the institutionalization of a firm.
Ownership and Governance: The third organizational filter moderating firms’
experience of complexity is ownership and governance. “Those in power most likely to
determine organizational responses to multiple institutional logics—and, in a way that
reflects their interests. In other words, appreciation and recognition of logics, and the
choice of which logic to prioritize and how to do so, will be dictated by those with power”
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 344). The corporate innovation literature discussed earlier,
although not explicitly articulating complexity, substantiates the importance of ownership
and governance. Owners inside the firm desired different innovation strategies than those
owners outside the firm (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Shifts in logics due to changes in
ownership is also seen in Bernstein’s article on innovation shifts within firms as they go
through an IPO. Further, research on family firms’ experience with complexity also finds
ownership and governance as critical (Miller et al., 2017).
Identity: Lastly, identity shapes how organizations perceive and respond to
institutional logics at two levels: the institutional level and the organizational level
(Greenwood et al., 2011). The institutional level concerns the socially generated labels
which grant legitimacy to firms who claim them and conform to their prescribe norms.
Organizations tend to respond to complexity in ways consistent with the institutional labels
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with which they have self-identified, necessarily enabling some actions while constraining
others. Identity at the organizational level:
is concerned with attributes that define the organization as different from other
organizations—especially those sharing the same institutional category. At this
level, identity has been shown to influence how expectations and pressures are
prioritized; and, perhaps more so, it has been shown to shape which repertoires of
possible responses are assessed and selected. (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 347)
Discussing both institutional and organizational identities is important as they form a more
holistic and nuanced understanding of how a firm perceives itself in relation to other firms,
both as a part of and distinct from other firms (Kraatz & Block, 2008); those perceptions
may be positive or negative, subsequently influencing behaviors differently (Greenwood
et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Firms may adhere to different identities to various
degrees: “The strength of an organizational identity is the extent to which it is deeply
shared, and the stronger the identity the more it will condition an organization’s approach
to institutional demands” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 348).
Organizational Responses
Research suggests organizations respond to institutional complexity through two
means: strategies and structures (Greenwood et al., 2011). Within strategic responses,
scholars contend firms generally respond in one of two ways. The first way is championed
by Pache and Santos (2010), who examine the extent to which firms accept field-level
norms and prescriptions, and study how “. . . logics are given voice within the organization”
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 348). This approach contends firms respond to complexity by
receiving logics into the firm and giving leverage to those logics best suited with firm goals.
The second strategic response is highlighted by Kraatz and Block (2008), who
assume more agency by firms and individuals within firms, stating organizations utilize
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identity as a mechanism to respond in four different ways. First, firms may choose a
dominant logic identity, reducing the emphasis of the competing logic identity. Mair,
Mayer, and Lutz (2015) label this strategy as a conforming hybrid. For example, social
enterprises, they argue, are inherently hybrids. Those that emphasize a social identity over
a profit identity—or vice versa—are conforming to a specific hybrid (Mair et al., 2015).
Second, firms may attempt to create shared meaning between identities in an effort to
satisfy both (Binder, 2007). For example, in Mair and colleagues’ (2015) study of over
seventy social enterprises, they found some firms innovate new governance structures and
mechanisms, thereby conforming to neither logic. Third, firms may retain both identities
and instead actively seek to minimize external conforming pressures (Smets et al., 2012).
Fourth, firms may compartmentalize identities through “symbolic commitment to certain
logics while preserving a core identity” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 350). This strategy
Mair et al. (2015) label “selective decoupling” disclosing it enables firms to choose the
best of both practices (See also Hamilton & Gioia, 2009).
Firms can also strategically use the same institutional logic in multiple
combinations. For example, Dalpiaz et al. (2016) examined Alessi, an Italian
manufacturing firm, who combined the conflicting logics industrial manufacturing with
cultural production. Over the course of three decades, Alessi used three distinct hybrid
strategies, “imbu[ing] its products with new cultural meanings” (Dalpiaz et al., 2016, p.
377).
Organizations also respond to institutional complexity through structures of two
types: blended and structurally differentiated. Blended structures seek to “combine and
layer practices from different logics” with the intent of “achieving field legitimacy and the
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positive benefits of both logics” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 352). Blending depends on
both micro and macro level factors (Lo & Kennedy, 2014) and is particularly difficult as
Battilana and Dorado (2010) demonstrate. In a study of two banks in South America,
Battilana and Dorado (2010) contend there are two primary approaches to hybridization:
apprenticeship and integration. Battilana and Dorado (2010) studied the hiring practices of
both banks in order to better understand how management engaged with developmental
and banking logics. One bank utilized the apprenticeship approach by hiring new
employees with backgrounds in banking, causing friction between current employees with
development backgrounds. Subsequently, the friction between the incumbent employees
with a development logic and the incoming employees with banking logic caused
operational problems. Executives were fired and growth substantially slowed. Conversely,
the second bank employed an integration strategy. They hired recent graduates with
allegiances to neither logic, enabling the bank to incorporate new employees into the hybrid
logic itself.
Structural differentiation is the other type of structural response. Greenwood et al.
(2011, p. 354) report firms responding with structural differentiation seek to separate logics
into different subunits, “essentially partitioning and compartmentalizing an organization
into different mindsets, normative orders, practices and processes.” A recent study (Miller
et al., 2017) demonstrates the importance of structure in how family firms can capitalize
on the strengths of market logic and family logic through a family firms’ governance
structure. They argue the ability for firms to effectively capture the strengths of both
depends on the level of family values within the community. The stronger the community’s
family values the more likely a family firm will have a family governance structure. In an
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environment with family dominant governance structures, they contend, family firms who
increase market logic elements would create synergistic combinations of both the market
and family logic (Miller et al., 2017).
As a corporate venture makerspace, MakerHub provides a unique research domain
because it creatively synthesizes in its design an institutionally complex blend of goals,
needs, and logics. From Product Inc.’s corporate perspective, MakerHub must justify its
existence. The two primary metrics established at MakerHub’s founding were to breakeven and to develop 12 never-seen-before products a year. Practically, then, MakerHub
must both balance the demand to be innovative with the ability to generate profitable
products. From a start-up perspective, MakerHub was also founded to be agile, ready to
pivot to consumer demands, necessitating employees be comfortable in ambiguous roles.
Lastly, from a makerspace perspective, the environment was founded to be conducive to
creating, experimenting, and learning.
Individual Responses
Past research demonstrates the constraining and enabling influence of investors’
logics on young-firm innovation. One study found that among types of investors—VCs,
corporations, and state funding agencies—state funding agency state logics constrained
young firm innovation; whereas, VCs’ professional logics enabled innovation, and
corporation logics fell between constraining and enabling (Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt,
2015). However, parental logics may also be influential through individuals who were with
the parent company but then transitioned to the new venture. In this section, I discuss the
relationship between complexity and individuals, attending specifically to how individuals
perceive, interact with, transform, and carry logics.
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Individuals transport logics via four mechanisms: artifacts, routines, symbolic
systems, and relational systems (Pallas, Fredriksson, & Wedlin, 2016). Delbridge and
Edwards (2013) apply Kraatz and Block’s (2008) emphasis on agency to the individual
level: “Logics do not determine action precisely because the institutional sources of action
are a relational feature of the actor position of individuals and their reflexive ability to
recognize opportunities” (p. 7). In other words, the logics-individual relationship is a
cyclical one where each constantly informs the other. While some argue individuals can
only choose from the logics available to them (Martin et al., 2017), the buffet of options is
dynamic rather than static.
At both the individual and firm level, identity is also crucial. Among available
logics, individuals can embrace multiple logics and their identities as long as those
identities do not simultaneously become salient. Brandl and Bullinger (2017) demonstrate
how the relationship between salience and identity impact individuals’ decisions to engage
one logic over the other. Past literature tends to divide into two broad perspectives of
logics’ impact on individual behavior, each based on distinct assumptions. The
socialization perspective understands logics as external forces which in large part drive the
thoughts and behaviors of the individual. Actors will choose specific logics based on their
knowledge of a logic, the accessibility of a logic, and the practice or experience with a
logic (Brandl & Bullinger, 2017). Conversely, the strategic perspective assumes actors
have greater agency in disembedding themselves from the environment and strategically
choosing what logics are most relevant to the situation. Brandl and Bullinger (2017)
contend individual behavior is based on salient identities that are hierarchically ordered
and chosen based on their importance to the individual. Utilizing identity control theory
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(ICT), they maintain that if no conflict exists between logics, individuals can maintain
association with both; however, when conflict occurs, individuals choose which is more
important to them and may even actively dissociate themselves from the other logic.
Understanding complexity at the individual level is challenging as complexity may
occur within the minds of individuals even if not manifested in actual practices. Recent
research demonstrates such a discrepancy can occur between firm logics and incoming
employees’ perception of what the firm’s logics ought to be (Smith, Gillespie, Callan,
Fitzsimmons, & Paulsen, 2017). And indeed, Products Inc.’s logics had (and continue to
have) a profound impact on MakerHub’s processes, practices, and goals— both directly
(firm level) and through individuals (individual level).
MakerHub was founded with competing goals: 1) develop innovative products, 2)
develop products quickly, and 3) develop products that are potentially profitable. Given
the impact parental logics may have on a new venture and the various strategies employees
may utilize to respond to those logics, I examine the ways in which MakerHub
implemented its institutional logics into its organizational design to navigate these
competing goals; the ways in which parental logics drew MakerHub to more closely imitate
Products Inc.’s own R&D Centers; and the benefits, if any, MakerHub provides to Products
Inc.
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3. METHODS
In this chapter, I discuss my potential biases and the philosophical assumptions of
qualitative research. Then, I review my methodology, research context, data collection
procedures, and data analysis procedures. Qualitative analysis emphasizes building theory
by meaningfully engaging in the research context, providing readers “think descriptions”
of both context and phenomena (Geertz, 1973).
Philosophical Assumptions and Self-Reflexivity
Any observation, interpretation, or synthesis of human action requires a lens
through which to see, question, and understand. In this section, I will outline my biases and
strategies for reducing potential influences on findings. Biases may arrive from past
experiences or educational background, forming paradigms by which the world is
perceived (Tracy, 2012). Paradigms are important to consider as they are “a basic set of
beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990, p. 17). My undergraduate degree is in the
Humanities, and both my graduate degrees (MBA and Ph.D.) are in business. My
assumptions of the world, therefore, are formed by both, and I view both business and work
as a means of human flourishing but not an end in and of themselves. In many ways, I am
a post-positivist, but hesitate to fully align with any particular philosophy of science.
Studying MakerHub was a unique experience for me because of my singularly nontechnical background. I did not participate in robotics or engineering-like programs
growing up. Therefore, studying innovation in an environment dominated by engineers was
both exciting and intimidating. I asked basic material, machine, and process questions of
how and why things work the way they do. For example, when an intern made cutting
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boards and deliberated types of wood to use, I asked about the benefits of various woods.
He described how some where better for cleaning. On another occasion, I asked one
MakerHub employee how extruders are made using a large machine MakerHub owns. He
described the process and the different steps he went through to prepare the machine and
how the machine worked.
My lack of knowledge concerning all things “Making” was both an advantage and
disadvantage. Positively, I asked many questions and did not assume I understood what
was going on. The engineers at MakerHub became my teachers, and they seemed to enjoy
educating me. This relationship was greatly beneficial as information and insights perhaps
otherwise unknown surfaced. The disadvantage of my non-technical background was that
I may have missed something. To truly appreciate something, a degree of knowledge about
that thing is necessary.
A second potential bias was my familiarity—albeit from a distance—of MakerHub
before my research began. I took several tours of MakerHub’s facility before I ever
considered research there. Moreover, MakerHub is lauded in both the community and
university as a place for innovation, entrepreneurship, and community engagement.
Therefore, I entered MakerHub’s environment expecting to find innovation occurring.
Qualitative Design: Ethnography
Qualitative methods have been heavily used in makerspace research (Cross, 2017;
DeRosa, 2016; Lacy, 2016; Lahana, 2016; Litts, 2015), entrepreneurship research (Baker
& Nelson, 2005; Lucas, Kerrick, Haugen, & Crider, 2016; Sarasvathy, 2001; Shane, 2000),
innovation research (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), and
institutional logics research (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016;
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Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Dalpiaz et al., 2016; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Smets et al.,
2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Indeed, over half of the articles on institutional logics
use qualitative data (Reay & Jones, 2016). Using a qualitative methodology is particularly
useful in these research streams because of the ability for researchers to examine contextual
elements, examine individuals within their work environments and the interaction between
individuals and their environments, and examine both intentional and unintentional actions
and how those actions unfold over time.
Benefits of Qualitative Approaches
Qualitative approaches have a number of benefits. First, qualitative research
emphasizes an organization’s everyday occurrences. Consequently, researchers’
viewpoints are formed through close relationship with the data, enabling descriptive
pictures of organizational life (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). MakerHub’s
employees work individually, work in teams, schedule meetings, engage in informal
conversations, and constantly communicate about work and non-work issues. All these
actions create meaning individually and collectively that inform how MakerHub innovates.
Qualitative research is well suited to capture this type of data.
Second, qualitative approaches also provide “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973),
which “are vivid, are nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth that has a strong
impact on the reader” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 11). Stimuli accost an individual’s brain
constantly with sights, sounds, smells, tastes, many of which are immediately dismissed
and forgotten. Humans tend to remember the abnormal rather than the everyday,
“uninteresting” events. However, sometimes the uninteresting is important to how events
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or processes unfold. Qualitative research is useful in catching some of these events that
may otherwise be left out of a respondent’s recounting.
Third, qualitative approaches are beneficial because studies are generally
longitudinal:
We can go far beyond snapshots of “what?” or “how many?” to just how and why
things happen as they do—and even assess causation as it actually plays out in a
particular setting. And the inherent flexibility of qualitative studies (data collection
times and methods can vary as a study proceeds) gives further confidence that we
really understand what is going on. (Miles et al., 2013, p. 11)
Longitudinal studies enable researchers to find patterns as some events may decrease in
importance or others become central to a study. Moreover, as events unfold, the focus of
observations or questions can change, enabling a researcher to potentially shift focus as the
data dictates.
Lastly, qualitative approaches enable researchers to gain nuanced understanding of
how individuals create and define meaning: “Qualitative data, with their emphasis on
people’s lived experiences, are fundamentally well-suited for locating the meanings people
place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives and for connecting these
meanings to the social world around them” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 11). Relationships are a
formidable factor in how individuals create meaning (B. Brown, 2015) and in how
innovation occurs. In his book Explaining Creativity, Keith Sawyer warns against solely
focusing on individuals in the search for understanding how and why innovation occurs
(Sawyer, 2011). Rather, he emphasizes examining individuals within groups, teams, and
environments to better explain outcomes.
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Ethnography
In this study, my data collection occurred in two phases: ethnography (via
observation and participation) and semi-structured interviews. I begin this section by
discussing ethnography. Ethnography is particularly useful for studying the creation,
design, and prototyping of new products within a makerspace because the researcher is
present as it occurs. Ethnography is an appropriate method to synthesize these multiple
data sources: “Ethnographic methods tend toward the descriptive. The analysis task is to
reach across multiple data sources and to condense them” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 8). Further,
ethnography is particularly useful for understanding the everyday routines of employees
(Van Maanen, 1979), how they make sense of the world around them, and their
interpersonal relationships with others (Demetry, 2015).
The decision to use ethnography was also formed by recent calls for more
ethnographic research in entrepreneurship. In the fall of 2017, entrepreneurship scholars
assembled at Princeton University to discuss the need for research of nascent ventures,
particularly research using an ethnographic approach. MakerHub is a nascent venture and
using ethnography to study how logics were implemented into its design, how innovation
occurred, the tensions forming innovation, and the ways in which MakerHub innovates as
distinct from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers contribute theoretically, practically, and
methodologically.
In the second phase of my study, I conducted semi-structured interviews of
MakerHub employees (See Appendix A). By interviewing MakerHub employees, I gained
further insights into specific questions concerning my research focus on how MakerHub
incorporates its institutional logics into its organizational design in an effort to innovate
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and contribute to Products Inc., enabling MakerHub employees to expound on what they
see as critical to the innovation process, potential barriers to innovation, and how they “fit”
within that process.
Institutional logics scholars have also emphasized the need for further research on
topics for which qualitative analysis is particularly useful. For example, questions such as
those regarding the material aspects of culture (Ashraf, Ahmadsimab, & Pinkse, 2017), the
process organizations use to systematically combine different logics (Dalpiaz et al., 2016),
and how individuals internalize logics and the micro conditions under which institutional
influences are carried to a greater or lesser degree into the practices of the organization
(Almandoz, 2014). All these elements were part of understanding how MakerHub
innovates. Given the prevalence of qualitative research within the entrepreneurship,
institutional logics, and makerspace literatures as well as the calls for further research from
a qualitative approach, I utilized ethnography and semi-structured interviews as a suitable
means of studying MakerHub.
Research Context
As noted, the context in which this study took place is MakerHub—a corporate
venture makerspace created in 2013 and owned by Products Inc. MakerHub’s founding
purpose was to shorten the idea-product cycle by acting as an external-facing entity
designed to enable a quicker feedback loop between engineers, makers, and consumers.
Moreover, founding leadership envisioned new products being generated through
community involvement—in other words, creating an open makerspace design where
anyone might walk in and work on their own projects or co-create on a MakerHub product.
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Hence, MakerHub’s stated mission (paraphrased) was to create, prototype, and test
innovative products by co-creating with the community.
Ideas for products come from MakerHub and Products Inc. employees, local
stakeholders (i.e. those who come in and use MakerHub’s workplace), and the community.
MakerHub employees discuss product ideas and suggest the best ideas to MakerHub’s
leadership team. If the leadership team perceives the product idea has potential, one or
more engineers may be assigned to work the technical feasibility of the product. Once the
engineer(s) are confident the product is technically viable, market research is conducted to
learn about potential interest among consumers. If there does seem to be a market for the
product, additional members may be assigned to the project, including the industrial
designer, additional engineers and commercial team members. As MakerHub’s engineers
work through technical problems, they often file patents for which they are (if accepted)
monetarily compensated by Products Inc.
During the stages of idea development, technical problem solving, and customer
research, the leadership team also considers the best go-to-market strategy. Past strategies
MakerHub has used include selling through the parent (Products Inc.), crowdfunding
through Indie-GoGo, or crowdfunding through MakerHub’s own website. Additionally, at
any point during these activities or stages, a project may be discontinued due to a perceived
lack of market interest, technical feasibility, operational feasibility, cost-price threshold, or
lack of product consistency with MakerHub’s first adopter brand image.
MakerHub has approximately 23 employees and consists of a commercial team
(sales, marketing, and social media/brand), product developers (many of whom are
mechanical engineers), product development technicians, designers, software engineers, an
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office manager, and a product enthusiast. Approximately half of MakerHub’s employees
have engineering backgrounds.
MakerHub is located on the edge of a large Southern university in the United States
and resides in a mid-sized city. University students benefit by having access to MakerHub,
its equipment, and employees. Business, engineering, and design professors occasionally
bring students to MakerHub for tours of MakerHub’s facilities. Moreover, MakerHub
offers part-time work opportunities to students who can gain hands-on experience building
first batch products in MakerHub’s micro-factory. The university provides benefit to
MakerHub through the use of MakerHub’s building at a reduced rent.
Data Collection Procedures
Participant Recruitment
When I began observations and participation in the fall of 2017, I informed
MakerHub employees why I was there and asked if I might occasionally observe their
actions and ask questions about them. All employees responded affirmatively and were
very willing to accept both my presence in their environment and informal questions. The
majority of data collected concerns MakerHub employees; however, I also collected data
during a hackathon MakerHub held as well as interviewed non-MakerHub employees.
Both hackathon participants and all interviewees I talked to were willing to be part of my
data collection.
Data Source and Observation Procedures
In total, I visited MakerHub more than 160 times and spent over 600 hours there.
Most of the hours I spent at MakerHub were between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. I also went there
on Saturdays, as well as before and after the stated hours. My observations began
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September 5, 2017 and continued through March of 2019. For the first several months of
observations, I averaged 20 hours a week to saturate myself in the culture, processes and
everyday actions of the people at MakerHub.
During this time, I participated in a weekend hackathon at MakerHub; learned how
to use the CAD software, Onshape, to make designs for MakerHub’s laser cutter that I
then cut out; became acquainted with the basics of computer software, using an Arduino
microcontroller; and cut foam board using a band-saw. Moreover, MakerHub employees
showed me how to weld, make wooden cutting boards, and pan-sear steaks.
While at MakerHub, I attempted to create some value for the company and
employees as my presence and questions consumed time from employees’ tasks. Therefore,
I attempted to engage in projects as a means of gaining deeper insights into MakerHub’s
processes, creating value for MakerHub, and enabling relationship building with the
employees there. I assisted with the creation, development, and analysis of customer
surveys that were designed to capture interest in different products MakerHub was working
on. I sat in on and participated in meetings which discussed timelines, product features,
promotional campaigns, crowdfunding campaigns, and conference details. I accompanied
MakerHub employees as they engaged with industry professionals, DIY enthusiasts, and
consultants.
At times, my activities at MakerHub were fast-paced and I jotted notes afterward.
Other days allowed sufficient time to take notes while there, even clarifying questions
about what was said or meant by statements or actions. The research analysis during this
period was iterative. I frequently read through my data, writing memos to myself about
potential themes that were emerging, and making notes about questions I had.
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Interview Procedures
I conducted 14 interviews using a semi-structured interview approach (See
Appendix A). Of these 14 people, two were employed by MakerHub when I started my
observations in the fall of 2017 but no longer work there as both were promoted to other
positions within Products Inc. Ten of the interviews were in person and four were over
the phone. I interviewed members of the executive team, commercial team (sales,
marketing, and social media/brand), product developers (many of whom are mechanical
engineers), and design team. I also interviewed the founder of a local non-profit, a maker
who collaborated with MakerHub, and a city government official who interacts with
MakerHub for various projects and events. In total, I amassed over 380 pages of doublespaced notes and transcripts.
Semi-structured interviews are a conversation between the researcher and the
interviewee (Babbie, 2015). The researcher navigates the general direction of the
conversations through planned questions, generated to address the study’s research
questions. However, as the interviewee emphasizes particular points, the conversation may
turn to other insightful topics (Haugen, 2015). My semi-structured questions (See
Appendix A) revolved around how innovation occurs on day-to-day basis, tensions
between types of activities (i.e. community, product development, sales), and the practices
and processes which enable and constrain innovation.
Trust and rapport are important components to effective conversations between
researchers and interviewees. Through my extensive time spent at MakerHub and the
employees’ openness to my being there, both trust and rapport were built, which alleviated
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potential timidity, anxiety, or awkwardness during interviews. Lastly, interviews were
audio recorded to ensure accuracy.
Data Analysis Procedures
To analyze the data, I imitated past research using ethnography and causal loop
diagramming methodology (Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002). This approach
enabled an in-depth understanding of processes and actions over time and generated “…an
explicitly dynamic and feedback-driven model” (Perlow et al., 2002, p. 932), which was
important to answer in what ways MakerHub implemented its institutional logics in its
organizational design and the benefits derived. The data analysis occurred in several stages.
In the first stage, I wrote down observations and notes as I participated in the activities
previously mentioned. I transcribed all field notes and observations myself, organizing the
data and inputting it into the qualitative software, Atlas.ti. In the second stage, interviews
were transcribed with the assistance of an artificial intelligence software. To ensure
accuracy, I read through transcriptions while listening to the recordings. I then imported
the transcriptions into Atlas.ti.
In the third stage of my analysis, I read through all the material multiple times to
saturate myself in the data, “gain(ing) a holistic understanding of the organization”
(Milosevic, 2014, p. 45). I also drafted a description of MakerHub, attempting to articulate
“what” before engaging in any interpretation of “why” or “how.” In the fourth stage, I
engaged in descriptive open coding, which consisted of identifying specific occurrences in
the data, relating to actions and processes. I then looked for themes around ways in which
MakerHub implemented logics into their organizational design, ways in which MakerHub
was enabled and constrained in their innovation processes, specific manifestations of logics
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and ways in which logics generated tension, and the mechanisms by which MakerHub
engaged with their stakeholders. Thematic analysis involves discerning patterns across data
forms, going back and forth between my observation and participation notes, and
interviews to create codes as themes emerge.
Coding is critical to discovering themes across participants and data types and has
been utilized by institutional logics scholars in past research (Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016;
Thorén, Ågerfalk, & Rolandsson, 2017; Villani, Greco, & Phillips, 2017). Following the
iterative analysis approach, I used descriptive first-level codes and analytic second-level
codes (Tracy, 2012, p. 184). Tracy (2012, p. 184) describes iterative analysis as a “reflexive
process in which the researcher visits and revisits the data, connects them to emerging
insights, and progressively refines his/her focus and understandings (Srivastava &
Hopwood, 2009).” I generated twenty-two descriptive codes and my end model consisted
of nine dimensions derived from the data.
Causal Loop Diagramming Method
As I coded the data, it became clear that MakerHub’s continuous innovation
processes were recursive and that MakerHub, designed to be unique, became increasingly
similar to Products Inc.’s R&D Centers. Thus, in the fifth stage of my data analysis, a
method enabling a holistic understanding was adopted to explain MakerHub’s evolution
and recursive system. To do so, I constructed a dynamic model using the causal loop
diagramming methodology (e.g. Sterman, 2000). Causal loop diagramming involves
“…follow(ing) an iterative process of identifying links among categories and then
returning to the data to confirm or disconfirm the links’ existence” (Perlow et al., 2002, p.
934).
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Dynamic models derived from ethnographic data can be useful in studying
processes within social systems (Weick, 1979). For example, scholars studied the ways in
which role changes within firms can delay benefits from new technology implementation
(Black, Carlile, & Repenning, 2004). Others constructed a dynamic model from
ethnographic data to study decision speed in startups (Perlow et al., 2002).
Throughout the analysis process, I referred back to precedent literatures to ensure
my findings contribute to scholarship. Further, to check the reliability, relevance, and
meaningfulness of my conclusions to practitioners, I discussed findings with various
MakerHub employees (Christians & Carey, 1989; Creswell & Miller, 2000). This process,
generally referred to as member checking, is important to both establish the study’s
reliability and validity and protect against misinterpretations.
Validity and Reliability
I followed past research and recommended practices for validating and reliability
procedures (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Milosevic, 2014). These included careful examination
of personal biases, member checking, triangulation, and extended immersion in
MakerHub’s environment.
Extensive participation and observation at MakerHub generated the core of my data
collection; however, I also conducted semi-structured interviews intended to triangulate
themes, which is critical to reliability: “The triangulation of data sources is critical as it
enables
collection of more accurate information and improves the robustness of the resulting
findings” (Milosevic, 2014, p. 48). I also engaged in member checking to ensure my
interpretations were accurate. These conversations proved invaluable in clarifying and
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nuancing my understanding as well as generating additional insights previously unknown
as employees brought up issues relevant to the study.
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4. FINDINGS
“I’m concerned we are becoming more and more like Products Inc., which I don’t
like.”
~MakerHub
employee
“Why are we wasting so much time and money creating 3D printed prototypes
when we could just do renderings?”
~former
MakerHub employee
“We don’t take big swings anymore. I’m embarrassed we even put that (pointing
to a wall listing products) on our wall under current products. That’s not
innovative!”
~MakerHub
employee
Two Product Development Organizations
At the Products Inc. Corporation, two organizations engage in new product
development. The first is a traditional R&D unit housed within the parent company’s walls
(Products Inc.). In this traditional R&D unit, each product line has an internal R&D team
engaged in developing advanced technologies. Product line A has an internal R&D team
A; Product line B has an internal R&D team B, and so on. Products Inc. executives then
determine what technologies are potentially viable and assign New Product Introductions
(NPIs) to project managers. The NPI process primarily consists of testing and design and
follows a checklist of steps which must occur before the product can launch (e.g. be sold
through various sales channels) (2017-10-4_O)2. NPIs may discontinue before launch due

2

(Year-Month-Day: O-Observation, I-Interview)
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to changes in executives’ priorities, project managers, design issues, or other testing
problems (2017-10-12_O).
The second organization engaged in innovation activities is Product Inc.’s
corporate venture makerspace—MakerHub, housed in a separate location less than ten
miles from Product Inc.’s headquarters. MakerHub’s purpose is to develop innovative
technologies, ideate new product ideas, and validate those new products through diverse
stakeholder engagement, small batch production, and sales. Although differences exist in
both the precise mechanisms of innovating and the scope of stakeholders involved, the
overarching function of both organizations is similar: explorative learning activities
intended to generate innovative products to increase Products Inc.’s overall profitability.
Consequently, each are evaluated based on their success enacting that function, which
generate similar centralized decision making norms (2017-12-14_O).
In the table below (See Table 1), grey rows represent similarities between
MakerHub and Products Inc.’s R&D; white sections represent differences between them.
As the table demonstrates, both use technology developed internally (either at Products
Inc. or MakerHub), and the source for the most radical and innovative products also come
from internal sources (Products Inc. engineers, MakerHub engineers). Moreover,
MakerHub employees have articulated frustration over slow, centralized decision making,
long product development timelines, lack of efficiency, and unnecessary processes, stating
such actions remind them of how product development activities are conducted at Products
Inc. (2017-10-19_O). At MakerHub, the end goals (explorative innovation) are
accomplished primarily by internal knowledge capital (Products Inc. and MakerHub
engineers). Thus, to adequately answer the research question—In what ways does
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MakerHub implement its institutional logics into its organizational design and what
benefits, if any, does MakerHub derive from its design—answering why an organization
with limited resources ends up with two R&D organizations is important.
Therefore, to answer these questions, we must first understand why Products Inc.
created MakerHub and how it was intended to be different. I describe this in the first section
of the chapter by discussing how MakerHub was intentionally created to be a distinct
organizational form. Once it is clear why it was created and how it was supposed to be
different, I then explain how it came to be similar to the R&D unit in Products Inc. in seven
stages: 1) Environmental Forces and MakerHub’s Founding, 2) Product 1 and “Can we
sell?”, 3) Expanding Customer Segments, 4) Success and Bureaucracy, and 5) Failure and
Learning, 6) Identity Crisis, and 7) New Division. I describe each of these phases in order.
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Table 1: Current Similarities (grey) and Differences (white) Between Products Inc. R&D and
MakerHub
MakerHub
Products Inc. R&D
▪ Quickly ideate, build, and validate
• Produce innovative technology relevant
Stated Purpose
innovative product ideas through
to product lines
engagement with external makers
▪ Develop innovation technology
• Develop innovative technology that
Actual Purpose
▪ Build, design, and validate new
could eventually go into new products
product ideas
Product
▪ “We aren’t fast enough!”
• “It can take years for a product to see the
Development
▪ “The process is inefficient and too
light”
Timeline
long”
Source of
Product
▪ Products Inc., MakerHub
• Products Inc., MakerHub
Technology
Primary source
for viable and
▪ Products Inc. engineers, MakerHub
• Products Inc. executives or engineers
innovative
employees
product ideas
▪ Analyze technical feasibility of new
• Analyze technical feasibility of new
Engineering
technology, develop/adopt new
technology, develop new technology,
Technical Scope
technology, stress test new
stress test new technology
technology,
▪ Managers decide what moves forward • Project managers decide what moves
forward and what does not.
▪ Cost driving product development
decisions
• Engineer related a time he worked for
▪ Before moving the project forward to
months on a project that was eventually
Decision
market validation, leadership asked
discontinued when a new project
Making
for cost-benefit analysis.
manager came in.
▪ [MakerHub] is becoming stifled with • Former CEO concerned project
“more centralized leadership making
managers were not developing
that emphasizes profits”
innovative enough products
Source of
Legitimacy

▪
▪
▪

Practices/Materi
al/
Structures
▪
Physical
Environment

▪
▪
▪

Cognitive Scope

Technology’s innovativeness
Organizational profitability

▪
▪

Profitability
Technology’s innovativeness

Daily meetings, scheduled work
hours, outcome reports, product
deadlines/Gantt Charts, Products Inc.
training meetings, end-of-year
evaluations, 5S
Open environment—anyone can walk
in
Located on edge of college campus
Makerspace with tools available to
anyone
Employees can explore/ideate
products related to small or large
home appliances

▪

Daily meetings, scheduled work hours,
outcome reports, product deadlines/Gantt
Charts, Products Inc. training meetings,
end-of-year evaluations

▪
▪

Located at Corporate HQ
Locked doors with special access
required to enter
Advanced machinery only used by
Products Inc. employees
Explore technology that could potentially
be used in large appliances related to the
specific product line in which they work
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▪
▪

▪

Focus on products easily incorporated
into Products Inc. manufacturing lines
OR on products small enough to be
shipped via FedEx directly to
consumers.
▪ Have access to makers, culinary
enthusiasts, first adopters, consumers,
Stakeholder
Products Inc., and other interested
▪ Products Inc.
Access
parties (local and regional politicians,
non-profits, startups, corporations,
universities)
▪ “You never know who will walk in. . .
Level of
That’s exciting!”
▪ Formal working environment
Formality
▪ “Coolest place I’ll ever work”
*Similarities (shaded grey) and Differences (shaded white) between Products Inc. R&D and
MakerHub
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Phase 1: Environmental Forces and MakerHub’s Founding
MakerHub’s mission was to ideate, prototype, and validate never-seen-before
technologies and products (2017-9-14_O). MakerHub would accomplish its mission
through shortening the idea-to-product cycle by soliciting makers, enthusiasts, and
potential customers for product ideas, feedback on proposed products, and testing
minimum viable products, which would lead to more feedback and further testing (20179-22_O).
When MakerHub was founded, the key parts still different from the R&D unit today
were made to be intentionally different (See Table 1). I describe those key parts below.
However, there were also parts which were intended to be different but are no longer
different. I will describe each of these as well.
Physical Environment. Product Inc. founded MakerHub with a distinct organizational
design (separate from itself) in several ways. First, MakerHub was founded to be unique
by being physically distinct from Products Inc. The term physical environment represents
the idea of tangible and aesthetic characteristics, which includes 1) geographic location
(located on a university campus and geographically separate from Products Inc.’s corporate
campus), 2) ease of building access (unlocked, open to anyone), 3) aesthetic distinctness
(open layout), and 4) availability of tools, machines, and areas to prototype (makerspace,
micro-factory).
MakerHub’s physical environment is in stark contrast to Products Inc.’s corporate
campus (2017-9-22_O). Whereas MakerHub is on the edge of a college campus, easily
accessible with a parking lot mere feet from the door, Products Inc. has gates with a
security guard; visitors have to sign in, and all employees walk through turnstiles to access
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the various buildings. MakerHub was intentionally designed to be physically distinct and
geographically separate from Products Inc. MakerHub’s leadership wanted to foster
creativity and thought the environment’s openness and accessibility would be welcoming
to makers and enthusiasts, generating increased engagement. However, these desires were
only partially realized.
The physical layout of MakerHub consists of four primary sections; each serves a
specific function. The first section contains two industrial kitchens and a number of
workstations primarily used by the commercial team and office manager. This space also
contains an area for meals and presentations and is used on a weekly basis for meetings
with all MakerHub employees present. Moreover, the space is used for interviews for
prospective interns or employees, conversations with interested news organizations, and
impromptu meetings between employees. In addition to the practical function, this section
also serves a symbolic function as the section contains a number of MakerHub products as
well as community developed prototypes, providing visitors tangible evidence of
MakerHub’s output.
The second section is the makerspace, consisting of two floors. The majority of
engineers sit at workbenches in the middle of the lower level while the software engineers,
designer, and social media manager sit on the upper level. The makerspace contains several
3D printers, a number of hand tools, a laser cutter, soldering stations, white boards,
workbenches, and several computer stations with CAD software. A second meeting place
is located off to the side with a large table, chairs, two whiteboards, and a TV to mirror
computer screens. Unlike Products Inc.’s locked R&D centers, the makerspace offers a
collaborative environment open to guests. MakerHub constructed the makerspace to
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encourage prototyping and building; however, the space is primarily used by MakerHub
employees or university students.
The third section is the workshop where many parts are machined. This section is
accessible only by a key card and people must wear protective eyewear to enter. This space
houses fifty machines, including band saws, lathes, mills, a water jet, table saw, joiner,
planer, sander, belt sander, surface grinder, and other machines and tools. This area also
contains shelves stacked with different types of wood. The workshop is a critical part of
MakerHub’s prototyping process as MakerHub engineers require customized components
for product development.
Adjacent to the workshop is the fourth section, the micro-factory, where many of
the initial production batches are assembled. Long workstations are designed so that
student workers and interns can assemble production units that have been sold. This section
also contains a storage area, loading dock, and several testing areas for product testing.
Products Inc.’s manufacturing capabilities are designed for large batch production to
maximize efficiency and lower per unit costs. For MakerHub to manufacture tens or even
hundreds of units at Products Inc. would be an inefficient use of resources. Thus,
MakerHub’s own manufacturing capabilities are cost-effective.
Cognitive Scope. The second way in which Products Inc. founded MakerHub as unique
was by giving its employees expanded mental space concerning product ideas, what I am
calling cognitive scope. Whereas Products Inc.’s R&D teams each have a defined product
line focusing and constraining their cognitive scope, MakerHub employees’ cognitive
scope extends to all product lines, including both large and small appliances. A key
distinction between the cognitive scope at Products Inc. and MakerHub is the frequency of
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making, experimenting, and employee autonomy—the ability for employees to work on
projects they find intrinsically interesting. When MakerHub was founded, the leadership
emphasized the importance of employees working on projects they were passionate about,
arguing that focused passion would enable more creative thinking and commitment to a
project. Of MakerHub’s founding director, one former employee remembered:
[The founding director] was a rare leader in which he wanted everybody to
explore the thing they were most passionate about. His theory was we've
hired really good people, and if they're on some sort of vein like let him
mine it. And you know if there's some way that they can find greatness in
the thing you are searching for, then awesome. And I think that was very
enabling with [Founding director]. (2018-12-12_I)
The makerspace environment and openness of MakerHub convey a creative space for
passionate people and are conducive to having impromptu conversations about product
ideas, mechanical explanations of “how things work” between engineers, or in some cases
just prototyping an idea (2017-9-14_O). While giving a tour to undergraduate students, a
senior member of the commercial team remarked that MakerHub often generates product
ideas through normal daily conversations between employees asking, “What about this?”
(2019-1-31_O). Products Inc. units also hold meetings, day-long trainings, and events at
MakerHub with the primary intent of spurring creative thinking.
Relational Access. Third, MakerHub was unique because its employees were empowered
with increased access to diverse stakeholders. The term relational scope represents this
idea of diverse stakeholder access. Whereas Products Inc. R&D engineers primarily
interact with executive management, product line project managers, and other engineers in
the R&D field, MakerHub employees interact with makers, culinary enthusiasts, first
adopters, consumers, Products Inc. engineers, and other interested parties (local and
regional politicians, non-profits, startups, corporations, universities, and news outlets).
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A significant assumption in the founding of MakerHub was that smart and creative
people desire to develop innovative products and associate with a place where ideas could
be iterated, prototyped, and potentially launched: “when we talked about community we
were mostly talking about a group of people that would be like minded individuals who
would want to tinker on new appliances ideas with us” (2018-12-17_I). MakerHub was an
attempt at capturing some of this brain power while also being a consumer-facing and
community-facing mechanism intended to create goodwill. Consequently, creating buy-in
from many in the community was critical to MakerHub’s ability to accomplish this
relational goal.
MakerHub’s founding was celebrated by many different stakeholders, enabling
potential opportunities for engagement. Excited stakeholders included makers, startups,
nonprofits, local and state governments, and a large state university on whose campus
MakerHub currently resides. Each stakeholder group viewed MakerHub as a positive factor
in their own mission, whether that be developing local entrepreneurial ecosystems, being
a resource to pre-stage startups building prototypes, attracting engineering and design
students, or claiming to be innovative through the creation of an entrepreneurial
environment.
To foster community engagement, corporate leadership determined MakerHub
must not only look and act distinct from the large, intimidating, corporate environment of
Products Inc. but also provide employees leeway to engage the outside community,
including makers, enthusiasts (first adopters, amateur chefs etc.), or potential consumers.
Consequently, MakerHub employees were encouraged to engage community members
both inside and outside MakerHub’s physical building. And the building itself was
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designed to inspire outside community to come into MakerHub. Whereas Products Inc.
requires all visitors check in at a security hut before entering through turnstile gates,
MakerHub often has individuals walk in unexpectedly, desiring to use machines, tools, or
take a tour.
a. Tours: Distinct from Products Inc., MakerHub engages with the community
internally in several ways, including tours and hackathons. Tours of MakerHub’s facility
are a practical way for community to “see what MakerHub is all about.” Tours range
anywhere from twenty minutes to over an hour, pending on schedule constraints, which
employee gives the tour, and for whom the tour is given. In fact, I once gave a tour when
MakerHub was short-handed (2018-9-10_O). MakerHub tours consist of three distinct
parts: first, an overview and the purpose of MakerHub and its relationship with Products
Inc. is discussed; second, the tour guide provides examples of past and current products;
and third, he or she showcases the equipment and machines available for both MakerHub
employees and anyone from the community.
MakerHub tours were also designed to create a sense of community and do so in a
number of ways. First, most full-time MakerHub employees give tours, including all
members of the executive team down to more recent hires, providing opportunities for
employees to articulate the purpose of MakerHub to diverse groups. Second, tours are a
means of showcasing products under development as well as those developed through
hackathons (braille stove top), by community members (laundry application for seeing
impaired), or failed prototypes (cold brew coffee maker). Tours showcase these various
products and are a means of talking about the engagement MakerHub has with its various
community members. Third, tours are an easy means of collecting visceral feedback about
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products under development. Often senior management will ask those on tours what they
think about various products, wanting to gain ideas or confirmation about what MakerHub
is developing. Asking for feedback provides a sense of participation by those taking a tour,
further establishing relational connections.
b. Hackathons: Hackathons share a dual purpose as they develop community
relationships and new product ideas. Hackathons generate diverse perspectives and engage
both potential entrepreneurs with new product ideas as well as validate customer and
product segments. Hackathons have grown from dozens to over a couple hundred
participants. For example, in 2018, MakerHub hosted a two-day hackathon that included
over 200 participants.
In the past, hackathons have also been a means of local non-profits engaging with
MakerHub on social-impact projects. For example, MakerHub’s first hackathon was in
partnership with a local non-profit that focuses on water purification mechanisms for third
world countries (2019-1-23_I). The hackathon centered on different purification solutions
to turn undrinkable water into drinkable water. More recently, a local government entity
and MakerHub’s management are discussing a civic hackathon focused on local
community problems.
c. External Engagement: Although MakerHub is successful in attracting diverse
visitor groups3, they also emphasize getting out into the community—both locally and
nationally (2018-7-9_O). One way MakerHub accomplishes this is by embracing the maker

3

Interested visitors come to learn about how MakerHub innovates, see the physical space,
and ask questions about ways to imitate MakerHub’s processes. Visitors include
consultants from top national and international firms, local and regional politicians,
CEOs and other executives from Fortune 500 companies, professors from Top 20
business schools, and journalists and media from national outlets.
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culture. MakerFaire is an organization that celebrates makers and making. The organization
helps local communities launch events that attract participants from local makerspaces,
companies, non-profits, makers, and regional high school and college students. MakerHub
has participated in the local MakerFaire for several years and even hosted the event in
2018. While a hackathon went on inside MakerHub, a MakerFaire was hosted outside its
building in the parking lot drawing over 3,000 people (2018-9-16_O). Although events like
MakerFaire are successful, MakerHub has been less successful in attracting makers into
the building to work on long-term projects. However, MakerHub has been extremely
successful engaging culinary enthusiasts such as local chefs (2018-2-14_O).
MakerHub engineers are particularly good at engaging culinary experts. For
example, in late 2017, MakerHub engineers were investigating the viability and desirability
of a product targeting grilling enthusiasts. A lead engineer on the project reached out to a
local butcher to gain advice and suggestions on both the process and expected outcomes
such as what the meat should look like, how it should taste, potential problems to avoid,
and best practices for storage and cleanliness. I accompanied three other MakerHub
employees to the butcher shop and we toured their facilities (2017-11-3_O).
MakerHub successfully generated excitement among many diverse stakeholders
within the community (2018-8-29_O). Moreover, MakerHub engineers often interact with
culinary experts to gauge product quality or functionality. However, MakerHub’s
assumptions concerning sustained participation by makers, both locally and digitally, have
not been fully realized, which has led to a recent effort to increase the quality of external
engagements (e.g. increased interactions) rather than quantity (2018-11-30_I).
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Level of Formality. Fourth, MakerHub was also founded to be unique because of its low
level of formality. MakerHub leadership believed a low level of formality would enable
greater external input (more outsiders would engage in the ideation, prototyping, design,
and selling processes). A low level of formality is demonstrated through MakerHub’s
emphasis on casual dress (most employees wear jeans and t-shirts), frequent laughter,
informal manager-employee relationships, loud music, and coffee shop type atmosphere—
all much more informal than Products Inc.’s (2018-2-19_O). Processes, rules, and symbolic
norms also embody specific logics. In an effort to be different from Products Inc.,
MakerHub embraced numerous anti-corporate routines and norms to create meaningful
separation between itself and Products Inc. Such actions include: 1) open access to the
building and makerspace, 2) casually dressed employees intended to enable outsiders to
feel comfortable coming into the space, 3) loud, popular music played throughout the
facility, giving a non-corporate, coffee shop feel to the environment, 4) using signs made
on MakerHub’s laser printers and shop bots, articulating the rules that connotes the
impression outsiders are not only welcome but wanted, and 5) free use of makerspace tools
including 3D printers, laser cutter, hand tools, soldering stations, CAD software,
workbenches, and gourmet coffee.
MakerHub’s efforts to create an informal culture welcoming to visitors worked. I
have observed hundreds of visitors via tours, hackathons, and events. Their reactions often
reflect surprise over the makerspace’s size and workshop’s capabilities; interest over the
types of products MakerHub has developed and is developing; and enjoyment of the
popular music, gourmet coffee, relaxed environment, and friendly employees (2018-915_O).
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MakerHub Founding Logics. In its founding phase, MakerHub exhibited distinctly
different logics than the traditional corporate or professional logic used to describe
Products Inc., demonstrated by creating a physically distinct, open environment conducive
to enabling and encouraging employees to think creativity and in untraditional ways.
MakerHub’s founding logics were further differentiated by leadership’s focus on creating
relational access, engaging community both inside and outside MakerHub. Lastly,
MakerHub attempted to also separate from Products Inc.’s logics by creating informal
social norms, which include loud music, gourmet coffee, open workspace, most employees
wear t-shirt and jeans, frequent laughter, impromptu cooking tutorials between employees,
and a flat social hierarchy (frequent and casual interaction between senior and junior staff).
I contend these practices, norms, and symbols suggest a different type of logic, a startup
logic.
MakerHub’s Founding Assumptions
MakerHub was founded with two fundamental assumptions. The first assumption
was that MakerHub could engage in a quicker, more creative, new product idea validation
process than Products Inc.’s traditional process by being both unique (e.g. physical
environment, cognitive scope, relational access, and level of formality) and capable of
ideating, building, designing, testing, and small-batch manufacturing new product ideas.
MakerHub’s second founding assumption was that external inputs (ideas, time, labor,
skills) from makers, enthusiasts, and potential consumers, would foster creative product
ideas, and assist with the building and designing of prototypes, further increasing the level
of product innovativeness. The goal was to develop innovative products quickly in order
to validate if there was a market for the product idea (profitable), a market for something
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close to the product idea to which they could pivot (potentially profitable), or no market
for the product idea (not profitable).
I examine these assumptions as they emerge through two key innovation processes:
1) Active Builds, and 2) Product Market Validation. An Active Build refers to the ideation,
prototyping, and design of a product. Product 1 and any accessory products (accessory
products are any products which are developed as part of or in addition to the initial
product) represents one active build. Product 2 (and any accessory products) represents a
second active build and so on. Product Market Validation refers to the number of customers
buying products. MakerHub leadership believed that they would be able to keep
introducing new builds as long as there was a general trend of validation of those builds
over time, a self-reinforcing, positive feedback loop (R1, See Figure 1). A self-reinforcing
loop is an unchecked, positive feedback loop which, left unchecked, can lead to exponential
growth. Exponential growth did not occur as loops, which I will introduce later in this
chapter, constrained this process. However, Product 1’s Build—Product Market Validation
process occurred largely as expected.
Figure 1: The Build-and-Validate Reinforcing Loop (R1)
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Phase 2: Product 1 and “Can we sell?”
Key Events: As depicted in Figure 1, MakerHub employees believed that product
development would occur through a process of building and validating. Therefore, they
began by trying to come up with a build that they could use to begin the process. One of
the initial engineers knew of a technology within Products Inc. that had not been built yet
that would enable “dumb appliances” to be reprogrammed to become “smart appliances.”
Product 1 was designed as an add-on that required intermediate programming knowledge
and was targeted to the DIY community—particularly makers interested in hacking their
home appliances. One employee at the time related,
So a project that we were working on early was [Product 1]. . . [MakerHub
engineer] had been looking around for ways that we could reach out to
community and he found out there was a conference . . . hosted by Make
Magazine in San Francisco. And so he told me we should sign up for it. So
[founding MakerHub director] said, ‘you're going to go out and speak at
this thing.’ And when we did, we said ‘we gotta have something to say.’
So we had been working on developing [Product 1], and we decided to
launch it coincident with that conference. . . .The Maker culture really
latched onto the idea that [Products Inc.] was interested in that (hacking). .
. .And we sold a lot of those things . . . I got on stage and talked about the
thing, and then we had a little chat with Make Magazine. And we sold like
. . . 50 in a day and 100 in a week, which was for us like crazy. (2018-1217_I)
MakerHub’s leadership interpreted Product 1’s success as evidence makers and
enthusiasts were willing to engage with MakerHub and willing to spend time hacking
appliances, despite MakerHub’s ties to a large corporation. Again, the same employee
noted,
If we're being honest, . . .most people who are involved in open source
don't think of big corporations as their friends. So that (success of Product
1) was an early indicator that we […] were doing things different. And the
people who are most likely to want to come out and purchase one of those
were the exact people that you would want to target for this thing because
they're dedicated beyond just being like a weekend warrior and they're like,
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‘Oh I'm actually gonna sit down and write some code for my appliances.’
So to get 300 people like that on board early on is actually a big deal. (201812-17_I)
Although makers were uninvolved in the ideation or prototyping of Product 1, MakerHub
leadership believed Product 1 confirmed MakerHub’s ability to engage makers and sell
new products, increasing its market validation. The building and validation of Product 1
led to activities that would culminate into the development of Product 2, such that
validation motivated more builds and more builds motivated more validation. This selfreinforcing, positive feedback loop occurred with MakerHub as the success of Product 1
quickly led to the continued development of Product 2 (the second build).
Summary: Affirming R1’s Process
MakerHub’s initial product targeted the type of people MakerHub wished to
develop long-term relationships with—namely, makers. Moreover, Product 1’s successful
market validation generated a second active build. Thus, the belief that product
development would occur through a process of building and validating was further
solidified through R1’s successful verification.
Phase 3: Expanding Customer Segments
Having validated the first product and verified the development process, MakerHub
employees then began developing Product 2. Product 2 incorporated precision temperature
technology in a single stovetop and probe. This system enables liquids to be kept at a
constant temperature. The stovetop provided the heat, and the probe measured the liquid’s
temperature, fostering greater control. For example, Product 2 allowed for individuals to
cook steaks via Sues Vide (in a pot of water on a stove), allowing users to cook steaks to
the desired internal temperature.
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Figure 2: Expanding its Target Market Reinforcing Loop (R2)

The level of Product 1’s success and market validation led to additional builds and
further product market validation activities as well as increased the Scope of Ambition for
Product 2 (See Figure 2). Scope of Ambition refers to how ambitious the organization is
becoming, which can include ambition relating to 1) how uncertain a product’s market is,
2) the number of external stakeholders involved in the product’s ideation, prototyping, or
design, or 3) the size of the market the organization is trying to capture with the product.
Product 2 suggested a greater scope for MakerHub’s ambition because Product 2
incorporated more market uncertainty (e.g. dissimilar from existing products and more
expensive4), increased the number of stakeholders involved (e.g. design challenge,
YouTube, news outlets), explored a different validation strategy (Indie GoGo), and was
targeted toward a larger consumer market (home chefs and culinary enthusiasts)5.

Product 2’s MSRP was $179, significantly higher than Product 1’s price-point of $20.
Product 2 required no coding and was targeted primarily to culinary enthusiasts who
desired precise control of cooking.
4

5
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An increase in MakerHub’s scope of ambition for Product 2 is further evidenced
by an increase in the number of organizational activities, which refers to the number of
activities related to the ideation, prototyping, design, and validation of a product. When the
efforts to market and launch Product 1 succeeded, MakerHub management duplicated
many of those same strategies for Product 2. However, MakerHub also increased the
number of activities, particularly around sales and marketing; they conducted a design
challenge, launched and wrote copy for their crowdfunding campaign, produced videos
demonstrating how Product 2 worked, and increased overall advertising spending.
Launching a crowdfunding campaign through Indie GoGo was an attractive option because
manufacturing costs could be covered by pre-orders, rather than generating up front cost
through manufacturing units and then trying to sell those units.
The increase in organizational activities subsequently increased the number of
stakeholders involved, which refers to the number of stakeholders involved in the ideation,
prototyping, design, and validation of a product. Stakeholders included the design
challenge participants, news outlets such as the New York Times, and over 2,000
crowdfunding campaign contributors, generating over $350,000. In addition to growing
consumer awareness, MakerHub attempted to use their community—both local community
and online community—through creating a design challenge, in which multiple individuals
submit design ideas to MakerHub, and the first, second, and third place finishers received
some type of remuneration. MakerHub’s design team incorporated aspects of each
finalists’ designs in Product 2’s design.
Reinforcing Loop (R2). MakerHub’s crowdfunding campaign was successful in that they
reached the required goal to continue on with the manufacturing and producing of Product
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2. MakerHub’s leadership interpreted Product 2’s success as evidence MakerHub could
sell to both makers and culinary enthusiasts. While Product 2 did not sell as many units as
hoped, successfully launching a crowdfunding campaign—particularly on their first
attempt—was a significant milestone in justifying MakerHub’s commitment to small
batch, quick product development (2018-12-17_I).

Moreover, the successful

crowdfunding campaign led to further validating Product 2’s potential by meeting the
crowdfunding goal via generating actual sales, an important step in the overall validation
process (Blank & Dorf, 2012). This process generates a second self-reinforcing feedback
loop (R2, See Figure 2), motivating both MakerHub and benefited stakeholders to
additional active builds and further market validation activities.
As noted earlier, MakerHub’s positive R1 feedback loop did not grow
exponentially. The overall lack of non-employee engagement with Product 2 partially
tested MakerHub’s assumption about the “tinkering” role non-employees would play in
product development. This assumption began to evolve as external inputs for Product 2
were primarily aesthetic and had little impact on ideation or technical development.
Although makers and enthusiasts were excited about MakerHub, its mission, and the type
of product development occurring, the design challenge was the most significant
contribution by anyone outside of MakerHub. One employee described the change in
thinking:
In the beginning, we had the hypothesis that community was going to be a group
of people that were kind of a jack of all trades. They were people that were
enthusiasts that were also makers that would be people that we could collaborate
with that would develop product with us. And then eventually we'll make prototype
to be something that they purchase. So we found that's not broadly true. Within a
large swath of the population there are (only) a few people that are similar to that,
people that are so passionate about something that they'll carry it all the way
through. (2018-11-30)
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Summary. Product 2’s development and launch suggests tension between startup,
corporate, and community logics. Launching a design challenged proved an effective and
efficient way to engage external aesthetic input (corporate logic) while also maintaining
the organizational identity of corporate venture makerspace—an organization intent on cocreating (engaging external input in the development process). However, Product 2
expanded MakerHub’s target market from maker to culinary enthusiast, increased
advertising spending, and utilized free marketing channels (corporate logic).
Phase 4: Success and Bureaucracy
During phase 4, several negative balancing feedback loops emerged (B1, B2, &
B3). Balancing feedback loops stabilize a system through tension, preventing the system
from collapse or exponential growth. These loops arise from the addition of two new
dimensions in the model: Awareness of Execution Problems and Bureaucracy. I define
awareness of execution problems as the extent to which individuals (both internal and
external to MakerHub) are cognizant of issues surrounding a product’s development,
design, or delivery. I define bureaucracy as the extent to which an organization implements
formal rules or protocols (See Figure 3). Below, I discuss Product 3’s process through R2.
I then highlight the challenges which arose, generating each of the negative balancing
feedback loops (B1, B2, & B3).
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Figure 3: Delivery Problems and Bureaucracy

Product 3 revolved around a product idea already available in large units to
commercial buyers but unavailable to the residential market. The technology and idea for
this product came from Products Inc. engineers who wanted to incorporate the product’s
function into a kitchen appliance unit; however, the idea received pushback and the
initiative stalled. When MakerHub was founded, those engineers saw a potential outlet to
make their idea a reality; MakerHub developed the idea into a stand-alone, counter top
product (Product 3). (2017-12-15_O)
Product 3 through R2. Similar to Product 2, MakerHub launched an Indie GoGo
crowdfunding campaign and utilized past marketing strategies and channels to create
excitement among first adopters and technology enthusiasts, including activities such as
conferences in which to showcase the product and talk with news outlets. However,
Product 2’s success also led to an increase in scope of ambition for Product 3. Product 3’s
MSRP was over $500 and was not targeted to makers. With Product 3, MakerHub was
testing a different consumer market.
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Product 3 also led to a significant increase in original activities. MakerHub spent
money for ads on Facebook, adopted a more effective pricing strategy, traveled to New
York City to promote the product and generate excitement among different demographics,
launched a website to gage interest, and continued to develop consumer excitement through
emails and website promotions. The amount spent on advertising and marketing also
dramatically increased for Product 3, which also led to an increase in the number of
stakeholders involved. One former executive related the marketing strategy and its impact
on Product 3’s overall success:
The other thing that's different is we really doubled down on a new channel for
generating leads. So all of the leads for [Product 2] were generated through people
that we happen to know, people who walked through the doors, channels that we
had access to. So, I'll give you one random example. [Products Inc.] had a
publication that they put out for investors and other people who are associated with
[Products Inc.]. We got interviewed by them and got out in front of them. Any
channel that we could access that was free for us. We got in front of [Products
Inc.’s] newsletter for Product 3 and media. For [Product 3], we weren't as nervous
about putting a little bit of money behind it because now we'd seen that it was a
channel that could work for us. So we did all of the free channels plus we turned
on the ads. And that was a huge thing for us to overcome because ads tend to be
pretty expensive to run. We had run seven thousand dollars worth of ads on the
[Product 2] campaign actually on YouTube of all places, and it resulted in like five
sales maybe something like that. . . We didn't really go very deep into ads on the
[Products 2] campaign. . . Seven thousand dollars sounded like just an
outrageously high number for us to spend for ads. . . We were hoping to see “oh,
seven thousand dollars and you sell another 300 or 400 units,” and we sold three
or four. But [a newly hired sales member] actually came in and said no we really
didn't do ads and so he actually ran the ad campaign for Product 3’s campaign.
And that really ended up being the thing that made him throw it to (millions of
dollars). Without that […] it wouldn't have been anywhere near as big as it was. I
don't think our ad spend was particularly efficient, but it was really important for
us to do it because it created a business that otherwise probably wouldn't exist.
(2018-12-17_I)
The increase in resources allocated toward marketing was so significant that according to
the marketing manager at the time of Product 3’s launch, the Products Inc. executive
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overseeing MakerHub called often, “freaking out” over the amount being spent on
marketing activities. (2018-12-12_I)
Challenges and Balancing Loops. MakerHub also experienced a number of challenges
with Product 3. First, while the engineers figured out the technical side of developing the
product as a stand-alone unit that could sit on a countertop, reliability, durability, and size
were all problems yet to be solved. Once the engineers felt certain they could solve those
problems, management told the commercial team to start the crowdfunding campaign even
though the end design and technology were incomplete. When the crowdfunding campaign
was wildly successful, the engineers were under significant pressure to not only deliver the
product as described but also to deliver on time (2017-11-29_O). One former MakerHub
employee remembered, “Whenever [Product 3] was going on, it was f***ing chaos. . .
Everyone was freaking out” (2018-12-12_I). MakerHub’s increase in activities increased
the awareness of execution problems. Further, an increase in awareness of execution
problems combined with the promise to customers of a certain delivery date resulted in a
sense of heightened pressure. An employee at the time viscerally remembered the chaos
and stress saying, “If we do another crowdfunding campaign, I’m quitting.” The increase
in awareness of execution problems coupled with the desire not to repeat the same level of
chaos which ensued generates a negative balancing feedback loop (B1 in Figure 3)
MakerHub’s first challenge also generated a second negative balancing feedback
loop (B2 in Figure 4) as an increase in stakeholders exacerbated execution problems.
Product 3 ended up being shipped over several months later than promised in the campaign.
The delay resulted in upset customers and hundreds of emails from people asking about
the delivery date of their purchase. Commercial team members whose jobs were to explore

83

sales channels and develop marketing strategies were now responsible for customer
questions, which subsequently led to developing standard protocols for how to respond in
emails, what could or could not be said, and how refunds were processed. One commercial
manager said, “I was responding to over 120 emails a day for weeks” (2017-11-30_O). The
increase in organizational activities, particularly the increase in advertising and marketing
spending, had the intended effect of raising Product 3’s visibility; however, when Product
3 was delayed, the increase in visibility also meant an increased awareness of execution
problems by external stakeholders (consumers, suppliers, or those following the
crowdfunding campaign). This dynamic generates a second negative balancing feedback
loop (B2 in Figure 3).
A second challenge MakerHub experienced with Product 3—generating B3—was
that once the product was shipped, MakerHub’s commercial team and product engineers
were ill prepared for the customer service aspect of selling a highly successful product.
These included angry customers who had broken units, confused customers who did not
understand how something worked and needed someone to walk them through it, ecstatic
customers sending congratulatory emails, and many other emails and phone calls for
various reasons. Additional protocols were developed for broken units, repairs, or replacing
units. Customers were directed to follow a standard procedure that included taking pictures
of the unit and emailing those pictures to a specific email address. The awareness of
execution problems prompted MakerHub leadership to develop protocols to better handle
reoccurring complaints and issues, which increased MakerHub’s overall level of
bureaucracy. As defined earlier, bureaucracy represents formal rules and protocols an
organization puts into place. As more issues were uncovered, protocols were developed.
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Handling customer complaints, product repairs, or other related issues were not
MakerHub’s original intent. This dynamic generates a third negative balancing feedback
loop (B3 in Figure 3).
A third challenge MakerHub experienced with Product 3 was the impact success
had on future products. Given Product 3’s success, consumers wanted and suggested addons. One consumer hacked an add-on and sent a picture to the engineering team who
thought they could develop and produce the idea relatively easily. Subsequent to the initial
product, a number of add-on products were developed and sold. These add-on products
were incremental innovations, “not the kind of innovations MakerHub was intended to
produce” (2019-2-19_O). To better maximize both Product 3’s profitability and accessory
product development, MakerHub restructured part of the engineering team, and the lead
engineer on Product 3’s development became lead on all projects related to Product 3
(2018-1-25_O). Product 3’s success generated additional incremental innovation products.
I have defined builds as distinct product lines. Accessory products are therefore absorbed
and are explained by the current model without further adjustment.
Because of Product 3’s success, leadership realized MakerHub could generate
significant excitement in broader markets among consumers enthusiastic about specific
value propositions. Product 3’s success encouraged more emphasis on marketing spending
such as promotional campaigns, conference engagements, and social media engagements
than past products.
Summary. In order to develop its own set of capabilities around sales and supply chain,
MakerHub needed more than a startup logic. A corporate logic was adopted and manifested
in a number of ways, including through digital content and marketing efforts. Just prior to
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transitioning between MakerHub and a Products Inc. promotion, one employee remarked,
“MakerHub is different now than when [the initial director] ran it. We used to be more
focused on makers, staying true to the community and who they are. Now we are more
concerned about making a profitable business . . . the difference in those approaches
necessitated different digital marketing approaches” (2017-10-17_O). When MakerHub
adopted a corporate logic to facilitate capabilities development, the startup logic driving
much of MakerHub’s initial approach was replaced. The emphasis on corporate logics is
further demonstrated in MakerHub’s focus and the number of projects worked on. One
MakerHub executive recently commented, “We haven’t had this many projects going on
since before [Product 3]” (2019-2-14_O)
Phase 5: Failure and Learning
During phase 5, two additional reinforcing feedback loops emerged (R3 and R4).
These loops arose from the addition of one dimension in the model: Process Learning
Emphasis. A process learning emphasis includes 1) the number of activities completed in
determining when market validation is considered to be done and 2) the rigor of metrics
used in determining when market validation is considered to be done (See Figure 4).
Below, I describe Product 4 and discuss Product 4’s process through R2. I then explain
how Product 4’s lack of market validation led to two reinforcing feedback loops (R3 &
R4). R3 and R4 are “vicious circles” (Weick, 1979), reinforcing overall decreases in active
builds and scope of ambition.
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Figure 4: Learning from Failure

MakerHub’s third crowdfunding campaign was a new brewing method for
residential coffee drinkers (Product 4). The product was both significantly faster than
current market solutions and provided gourmet coffee shop quality. An emphasis in their
go-to-market strategy for this product was engagement with experts on the product’s taste.
Because this was a first of its kind invention that revolved around the consumer’s
perception of quality, MakerHub management and engineers felt the taste had to be
comparable to what the high end coffee shops produced. Consequently, MakerHub
engineers spent significant time engaging with coffee experts, particularly with baristas at
local high-end coffee shops.
Product 4 through R2. MakerHub’s increased ambition with Product 4 is demonstrated
in Product 4’s novelty (unlike any other product on the market), MakerHub’s increased
engagement with coffee baristas over taste, and both MakerHub’s uncertainty in how big
the actual market was and uncertainty over the price point consumers would be willing to
pay. Moreover, similar to past actions, MakerHub repeated the activities which made
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Products 2 and 3 successful (e.g. marketing channels, engaging enthusiasts, launching a
crowdfunding campaign etc.). MakerHub also held a design challenge, launched a
crowdfunding campaign, and utilized past marketing strategies (2017-12-19_O),
increasing the number of stakeholders involved.
Lack of Product Market Validation. Past engagements with Indie GoGo liaisons had
taught MakerHub that for crowdfunding campaigns to be successful, the campaign’s first
couple days and final day were critical to the overall outcome as those were the biggest
“funding” days. When MakerHub launched their innovative brewing method, the first
couple days were underwhelming. Management was concerned the target goal would not
be reached and decided to pull all advertising spending on Product 4, contending that if the
product truly had value, advertising spending would not be necessary. Others argued that
when advertising spending was cut for the product—primary through Facebook and other
social media sites—there was little likelihood of Product 4 reaching the goal, and all
potential for the product to move forward shut down.
Consequences and Reinforcing Loops. The failure of Product 4 had two primary
consequences on MakerHub’s subsequent actions. First, management emphasized the
importance of learning from the failure in an effort to avoid future similar mistakes.
MakerHub is an organization constantly learning, particularly within its engineering
functions via prototyping and testing; however, Product 4’s lack of market validation led
to an emphasis on process learning. Again, a process learning emphasis encapsulates the
activities and metrics MakerHub uses to determine when the market validation process is
done.
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Although well intentioned, a dramatic increase in a process learning emphasis led
to some level of paralysis: “I think the organization got PTSD after that happened [Product
4’s unsuccessful launch]. And it shouldn’t have happened because our organization was
designed to . . . be a culture that would be able to manage failure. And I don’t think it
managed that very well” (2018-12-17_I). Another executive commented, “We should’ve
just moved on. [Product 4] failing wasn’t that bad. . . We held a funeral for that thing. Just
move on . . . we learned the heck out of that” (2019-2-14).
The second consequence of Product 4’s failure was on the number of active builds.
Although MakerHub continued to launch products, they were primarily accessory
products—already within an existing product line (e.g. within Products 2 and 3). New
active builds appeared to slow as a process learning emphasis dictated more activities and
more rigorous metrics to ensure similar mistakes were avoided. Management’s emphasis
on process learning was evident even in lower risk items. For example, management
debated for several weeks over one accessory item’s price point. Finally, one exasperated
executive said emphatically, “just ship it out the door. If it doesn’t sell, who cares? Just get
it out! It’s low risk” (2017-12-4_O). The desire to avoid future failure led to an increase in
validation activities (e.g. surveys, consumer interactions) as well as an increased focus on
low risk, accessory products. MakerHub’s actions suggest a negative reinforcing feedback
loop (R3, See Figure 4).
Efforts to learn from Product 4’s failure spawned additional processes and
practices, increasing overall firm bureaucracy, generating an additional reinforcing
negative feedback loop (R4, See Figure 4). Practices include a significant increase in
surveys soliciting potential consumer preference around product features and an increased
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emphasis on financial analyses. Although these practices are often couched in terms of
learning, employees have voiced frustrated at the apparent decrease in product
development speed and increase in overall risk aversion. However, as one employee noted
to me that although he thinks MakerHub is slower now (as a result of Product 4’s failure),
speed is difficult to measure because MakerHub is developing its own technology on
several products rather than taking existing technology from Products Inc. This is an
important point as part of MakerHub’s initial intent was to validate quickly. By developing
its own technology, MakerHub is slowed and further imitates practices already conducted
in Products Inc.’s R&D centers.
Summary. After Product 4’s unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign, there was a significant
shift in logics, which resulted from several coinciding factors. First, MakerHub’s founding
director left for a personal family reason, and a long-time Products Inc. project manager
(and engineer) was instilled as MakerHub’s new director. Although a startup logic would
rationalize failing as both expected and necessary, the new director had been embedded in
a professional-corporate logics hybrid where failure presents a learning opportunity to
avoid future failure. Employees who speak fondly of this director also lament, “he [the new
director] is very risk averse” (2019-2-14_O).
A second factor impacting a shift in MakerHub’s logics was the increasing
profitability of Product 3 and the ability to produce even more accessory products. The
failure of Product 4 combined with the continued success of Product 3 enabled MakerHub’s
new director and primary decision maker to rely on his past thinking as a professional
manager in a corporate setting. MakerHub could be profitable and reduce risk by launching

90

low technology, inexpensive accessory items that required relatively little resources and
generated sufficient financial returns.
The success of Products 1 and 2 were justification for MakerHub’s initial leadership
coalition to increase the scope of ambition, culminating in significant investment of
Product 3’s development and marketing. However, Product 4’s failure pressured the new
leadership coalition dominated by a professional and corporate logic to renew efforts to
maximize past innovations (Product 3) rather than continuing with a startup logic of
quickly attempting new ones. The institutional logics perspective helps explain this shift
and why an organization founded to be distinct began making more centralized decisions—
similar to Products Inc.’s R&D function.
Phase 6: Identity Crisis
The success of Product 3 and its subsequent add-on products provided a conundrum
to MakerHub’s management. Was the goal to become profitable or innovative? A number
of firm wide meetings ensued where employees argued over the mission and vision of
MakerHub. Sales personnel questioned the extent of their role if profitability was a minor
goal. Others, particularly those who helped start MakerHub, contended that the
fundamental goal of MakerHub was to innovate and validate never-seen-before products,
not develop long-term sales strategies. Moreover, they argued, MakerHub was becoming
much like Products Inc. in its profit emphasis, centralized decision making, longer product
development timelines, and process of identifying problems fostering product solutions
(2017-10-13_O). Below, I relate the conflicting factors spawning these identity
discussions. I then summarize by relating MakerHub’s efforts to maintain aspects of its
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founding identity (driven by startup and community logics) while simultaneously shifting
its focus (driven by professional and corporate logics).
Conflicting Factors. Several conflicting factors spawned these discussions over
MakerHub’s core identity and purpose. First, some argued that if the goal was to be
profitable, why have MakerHub be distinct from Products Inc. at all? Although MakerHub
is well fitted to prototype single units or “hack” existing products, it was not designed to
produce units at scale. Therefore, if MakerHub was to shift its focus to a profit motive, the
space constrained rather than enabled. Indeed, Products Inc.’s facilities were much better
equipped for large scale production. As one former MakerHub executive commented,
“MakerHub … is a physical space that can make goods. (MakerHub existed) only because
Products Inc. wasn't ready to say, ‘Hey, we can create a place in our factory where we can
make the stuff.’ There's nothing that is unique about the equipment back there, so you don't
actually, in my opinion, need a physical space” (2018-12-17_I).
A second factor that generated disagreement among employees about MakerHub’s
identity and purpose was the way in which MakerHub began imitating Products Inc.’s
decision making norms and the metrics by which decisions were made. Like Products Inc.,
MakerHub began operating under a central decision maker. Also similar to Products Inc.,
product decisions were being primarily driven by financial metrics, such as how many
resources will be required to develop the product, and how risky the product is perceived
to be. Answers to these decisions further informed the length of product development,
potential customer segments, sales channels, and marketing strategies. In regard to the
growing similarities between MakerHub and Products Inc., one employee commented how
the “budgeting processes is becoming extremely granular” (2019-2-14_O).

92

A third factor that generated discussion over MakerHub’s identity and purpose was
how decision making impacted what product ideas were invested in. Many current and
past employees mentioned MakerHub’s seeming lack of focus on developing innovative
products. As one team member lamented to me: “We don’t take big swings anymore. I’m
embarrassed we even put that (pointing to a wall listing current products) on our wall
under current products. That’s not innovative!” (2019-2-14_O).
Summary. As MakerHub grappled with its purpose and identity, leadership utilized a
segmented strategy, keeping distinct logics in tension. A corporate logic is apparent
through the efforts to maximize Product 3’s success and was further demonstrated by an
emphasis on developing profitable accessory products. Moreover, professional logics
were strongly apparent through the continued emphasis on safety, fully understanding
product technologies, and stress testing.
MakerHub continued to be involved in local events such as MakerFaire, host
hackathons, give tours, and hold events—all demonstrating at least trappings of a
community logic. Further, leadership consistently utilized words, phrases, and symbols
representative of a community logic, such as “we are all about community,” “we want you
to engage with us,” “[MakerHub] begins and ends with community.” As MakerHub’s
focus shifted, so did the definition of what “community” meant. I asked one long-time
former employee if MakerHub still did “co-creation,” which is the idea of engaging with
community to ideate, prototype, and design products with non-employees, she said, “No
way!” (2017-12-17_O). However, when I asked a different employee, a senior member
who had not been at MakerHub as long, he said, “I think we do co-creation now better
than ever” (2017-12-19_O). His argument was that consumers were being questioned
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about product features more than previously, which was his definition of co-creation. I
found that employee tenure tended to be the primary determiner of how an employee
responded to the question: does MakerHub do co-creation well? Whereas new employees
felt like MakerHub did co-creation well, thereby embracing a community logic, longer
tenured employees felt an emphasis on co-creation (and subsequently a community logics)
had decreased.
Lastly, efforts to maintain processes driven by startup logics primarily revolved
around low-tech products or products requiring few resources to validate. During this time,
MakerHub was approached by various external entities who wanted to engage with
MakerHub’s engineers on projects related to a specific need. For example, a local religious
leader asked MakerHub to develop an appliance add-on enabling easier adherence to
religious observances. MakerHub engineers also worked with a local apartment complex
to develop a vending machine-like system for laundry applications, enabling users to pay
with credit cards rather than coins.
When I discussed MakerHub’s current activities to engage external input in the
ideation, development, design, and prototyping process with a former community member,
he praised the quality of MakerHub’s engineers but said he thought they were constrained
in their ability to get customer feedback:
[MakerHub engineer] fantastic guy! He has his heart and his head in 100%
the right place. In the three years I was in (city name), I saw him bump his
head up against, like a bunch of times I've seen him try to go out and get
customer feedback, and he gets his hand slapped every time by
management, and I guess he's learned that that's not something we try to do.
. . I think that's problematic. . . I think that their commitment to learning
anything from the crowd is superficial. (2018-12-19_I)
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Although MakerHub exhibits all four types of logics, disagreement and confusion over
MakerHub’s identity and purpose impacted the kinds of activities, the amount of resources
allocated to those activities, and the ways in which employees were encouraged or
discouraged in pursuing diverse activities.
Phase 7: New Division
During phase 7, a fourth negative balancing feedback loop emerged (B4). An
exogenous shock (New Division) generated an overall shift in MakerHub’s strategy by
decreasing overall activities, leading to a new dimension: Stakeholder Closeness, which I
define as the level and frequency of engagement with external stakeholders in the product
development process (See Figure 5).
Figure 5: Exogenous Shock and Stakeholder Closeness
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Key Events. In the fall of 2018, Products Inc. launched the small appliances division, and
two of MakerHub’s senior management team left MakerHub to lead it. Once MakerHub
validates the market for a new product, the small appliances division will take over,
enabling MakerHub to reduce the overall total number of activities related to sales and
marketing new products, decreasing B1’s impact on R2. The new division’s impact on the
overall system is already captured in the model, and new division is not a dimension in the
system. The purpose for visually including new division in the model is for conceptual
clarity (See Figure 5).
The launch of the small appliances division spawned a refocus on developing product
ideas. The new division enabled MakerHub to shift resources away from commercial
related activities toward market validation activities, decreasing the number of original
activities. One sales member lamented, “we have no interest in being profitable anymore”
(2019-2-13_O). Further MakerHub's recent successes in crowdfunding low tech, low cost
items through its own website are viewed by management as a means of interacting with
different consumer groups around preferences and needs, maintaining its “maker” image,
symbolically solidifying R1. MakerHub’s primary strategy for selling high-tech riskier
products is through Products Inc.’s formal channels rather than through its own sales
channels under the MakerHub brand, which further reflects this shift in resource allocation
and decrease in commercial related activities, decreasing B2’s influence on R2.
Major Actions. The launch of the new product division enabled MakerHub to refocus on
ideation and relational engagement with enthusiasts (R1 & R2). One executive noted, “We
haven’t worked on this many projects (concurrently) since before [Product 3]” (2019-2-
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14_O). Increased efforts are also underway to attract more makers and enthusiasts into the
building. A current employee explains the shift in mindset:
We're trying to be more close to community, more intimate. We're trying
to be more physical with community as opposed to having [a] digital divide
here because we found that we […] have a large number of people there
internationally and on the digital side that are interested in [MakerHub].
But the amount of feedback that we're getting from them is relatively small
in context to the amount of effort we might put into that. So we found that
finding that searching for the groups that we want to interact with instead
of having them come to us might be a better solution for getting higher
fidelity feedback from the people that are going to care. So we've been
strategizing on different ways to discover these enthusiast groups here
locally or regionally and coming to them and learning from them. (201811-30_I)
Budget spending further reflects the shift in focus (See Phase 5 in Table 4). Recently,
MakerHub hired a full-time community relations specialist to oversee, initiate, and develop
community relationships both locally and nationally.
MakerHub is currently shifting from an emphasis on broader activities and broader
reach to more specific stakeholder engagements (i.e. stakeholder closeness) and a more
focused set of activities around product validation. MakerHub’s renewed focus on
validation is a return to its founding purpose; however, their stakeholder emphasis is
subtlety different. MakerHub’s founding belief was that by engaging external inputs,
MakerHub could quickly generate and prototype innovative product ideas. However,
MakerHub realized makers will not be a core mechanism for quick, innovative product
ideation or prototyping. Moreover, given its resource constraints and inability to
exponentially go through R1’s feedback loop, MakerHub is attempting to maximize each
engagement rather than maximize the number of engagements—focusing less on the
quantity of stakeholders involved and more on those who provided greatest input toward
product market validation. This relationship generates a balancing loop as the quantity of
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information and feedback decreases but the quality increases (B4, See Figure 6). This
development is potentially critical as through emphasizing stakeholder closeness,
MakerHub may fulfill part of its initial purpose by capturing innovative product ideas from
external inputs, distinguishing itself from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers.
Summary. The new small appliances division alleviated many of MakerHub’s selling and
marketing activities, enabling MakerHub to refocus toward community logics,
demonstrated through MakerHub’s emphasis on physical engagement and their hiring a
relations specialist. Moreover, the shift in activities also lessoned the centrality of corporate
logics with MakerHub’s daily activities.
Summarizing MakerHub’s Evolution
At the outset of this chapter, I stated the following research question: If the end
goals (explorative innovation) are accomplished primarily by internal knowledge capital
(Products Inc. and MakerHub engineers), why does an organization with limited resources
end up with two R&D organizations? This section attempts to identify MakerHub’s critical
loops determining the overall system and to summarize how MakerHub’s product
development system caused MakerHub, founded as a distinct entity, to more closely reflect
Products Inc.’s R&D capabilities and practices.
Critical Loop. Weick suggests one way to determine a system’s outcome is to identify its
critical loop (assuming loops are of unequal importance); if the loop is a reinforcing loop
(deviation-amplifying), the system will likely collapse, and if the system is a negative
balancing loop (deviation-counteracting), the system will likely stabilize (Weick, 1979).
One means of identifying the critical loop is by counting the inputs and outputs for each
element and then determining which loop includes elements with the most inputs and
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outputs (Weick, 1979). Product Market Validation contains six inputs and outputs. While
no dimensions have five, three dimensions have four inputs and outputs: Scope of
Ambition, Number of Stakeholders, and Awareness of Execution Problems. This suggests
either R2 or B1 is the critical loop as both loops contain three of the four dimensions, but
neither contain all four, so using this method of determining the system’s fate appears
inconclusive.
If loops are assumed to hold equal importance in the system, Weick suggests a
second strategy may be useful in determining the system’s fate. This method involves
counting the number of negative loops: “By a negative loop we mean a closed loop that
contains an odd number of negative causal relationships. We would predict that any system
will survive as a system only if it contains an odd number of these negative loops” (Weick,
1979, p. 76). According to this strategy, MakerHub has a deviation-amplifying system
(even number of negative loops), suggesting its system is unstable. Problematically,
though, the data does not support the idea that MakerHub’s loops hold equal importance.
In an effort to discern the core of MakerHub’s system, I consider two competing
goals that have, at one time or another during its history, driven MakerHub’s decision
making: profit or innovation. Below, I consider how these goals interacted with product
market validation—the dimension with most inputs and outputs.
Finite Resources Constrained Innovation. MakerHub was built on the idea R1
represents; build and validate, which leads to additional building and validating. However,
MakerHub has a finite number of resources; therefore, as MakerHub proceeds through R1
and R2, generating more builds, available resources to allocate to new active builds
decreases. Balancing loop B1 regulates MakerHub’s overall scope of ambition as
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MakerHub’s awareness of execution problems and actions to solve those problems entail
an understanding of what is technically and operationally feasible given the resources
available, consequently decreasing the rate at which MakerHub can proceed through R1
and R2. At founding, an important distinction between MakerHub and Products Inc.’s
R&D was the speed at which the build process occurred; however, B1’s regulation slowed
R1 and R2 processes, decreasing MakerHub’s overall distinctness from Products Inc.’s
R&D.
Execution Problems Constrained Innovation. At founding, and in contrast to Products
Inc.’s R&D Centers, MakerHub’s cognitive scope was intended to be broad, enabling
innovative product ideas across product lines or even appliance size. However, over time,
MakerHub’s cognitive scope became more constrained. Innovative product ideas generate
additional stakeholders and additional execution problems—problems that further decrease
speed. Consequently, B2 regulates R1 and R2 as MakerHub’s understanding of execution
problems coupled with the potential publicity of those problems demotivates higher-risk
product ideas.
Developing Commercial Capabilities Constrained Innovation. Balancing loop B3
further regulates MakerHub’s overall scope of ambition and the speed at which MakerHub
can proceed through R1 and R2, decreasing the number of products validated. After
Product 3’s successful market validation, MakerHub leadership attempted to hand it off to
Products Inc.; however, Products Inc.’s leadership refused. One interviewee recalled,
We'd said this place existed so that we can validate something and then
when we validated it, they’d (Products Inc.) take it. And they wouldn't take
it. We had the meeting with everyone all the way up to the CEO, and it was
decided, “We (Products Inc.) don't know what to do with this. We can't do
anything with it. So, you guys (MakerHub) are going to own it.” . . . It
didn't make sense for the guy who was responsible for sales to take one of
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the salespeople who could generate 100 million dollars in sales and have
them spend all their time developing a market for something that may sell
another 3 or 4 million dollars next year. (2018-12-12_I).
Consequently, MakerHub developed capabilities it was not initially designed for,
specifically extensive sales activities geared toward broader markets and sales channels.
To more effectively navigate both sales practices and customer engagement, MakerHub
implemented protocols, increasing the firm’s bureaucracy. These activities also increased
the need for more central decision making as more consequential, far reaching relationships
developed. Collectively, balancing loops B1, B2, and B3 regulate MakerHub’s ability to
quickly build and validate as resources were allocated away from validating products to
commercial activities; execution problems further demotivated MakerHub’s ambition
slowing R1 processes.
Product 3’s continued success (including accessory products) required additional
resources and capabilities around sales and marketing activities (B1 and B3), decreasing
overall resources focused toward generating novel product ideas further decreasing speed
through R1 and R2 processes. Product 3’s success and profitability forced MakerHub to
consider competing realities: 1) there is a limited number of resources, 2) the number of
products that can be potentially prototyped is much larger than the number of products that
can be potentially sold, 3) Product 3 accessory products (and similar types of products) are
faster, cheaper, and lower risk to develop; therefore, 4) is the goal profit or innovation?
Slowing R1 and R2 to Develop Innovation and Maximize Profit. As described earlier,
Product 4’s unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign coincides with an increase in risk-averse
decision making, generating a process learning emphasis. A consequence of limited
resources, competing goals (e.g. innovative or profitable), and a desire to avoid future

101

mistakes was that MakerHub’s scope of ambition became bifurcated toward two types of
products: either innovative, technology infused, high-risk products or non-innovative, low
technology infused, low-risk products. Low technology products were low cost, faster to
prototype, and required fewer resources to validate. Moreover, a number of low risk
products (particularly Product 3 accessory products) were “hacks” created by consumers
and suggested back to MakerHub. Examples include a product enabling an increase in
capacity and a cleaning kit for Product 3. MakerHub validated and continues to validate
many of these types of products through crowdfunding campaigns held on its website. They
launch small batches, generally ten units, as “tests” to see if consumers purchase them, and
MakerHub has launched several low technology products this way.
Conversely, higher risk, innovative products are assigned two or three engineers.
The engineers are tasked with developing the technology and building the product in a way
Products Inc. could incorporate into its manufacturing capabilities and sell at a high margin.
Core value propositions, product feature sets, and price points have all proved challenging
in this process. When I once asked the commercial team about their process for identifying
answers to these questions, I was told “we are a pretty good representatives of our customer
base.” However, consensus is rarely quick, and several engineers confided their frustrations
over not knowing what features to include and exclude in the product. These challenges
slow product development and market validation (R1 and R2). For example, in my notes
concerning one product under development, I wrote,
Seems like a merry-go-round between software, hardware and marketing.
The software component say they need to know what the [product] will have
so they can write the code. The hardware people say they need to know what
consumers want before they can fully develop the product. The marketing
people say they need to know what wow factors the [product] will have so
they can write a compelling story for the crowdfunding campaign. Nobody
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knows what price point will sell best and what features will set the product
apart. (2017-11-29_O)
MakerHub attempts to maintain its image of quickly building and validating products by
generating low technology products often with external inputs (such as consumers or
student groups). Their image of being an innovative company is sustained through longterm, high-risk products that may or may not ever be handed off to Products Inc.
Further slowing down innovative products’ validation is an increase in overall
bureaucracy, generated by both the success of Product 3 and the failure of Product 4. Also,
MakerHub generates much of its own technology for its current, highly innovative products
under development rather than its initial practice of utilizing existing technology at
Products Inc., further decreasing speed from prototype to validation.
Stakeholders as a Mechanism for Innovation. One of MakerHub’s founding
assumptions was that by engaging with makers and enthusiasts, they could quickly
prototype and validate innovative products, increasing MakerHub’s process through R1.
This assumption is evident through MakerHub’s founding components (physical
environment, cognitive scope, relational access, and level of formality), through their initial
digital marketing strategy (e.g. maker focused), through the metrics established (e.g.
develop twelve new products a year), through Product 1’s target market (makers), and
through the overwhelming response by diverse stakeholder groups.
Although Product 1 created excitement within the maker community, Product 2
targeted a broader customer segment, demonstrated by the type of product itself (required
no coding or “hacking”), the increase in price point, and the product’s overall success (sold
more units). Product 2’s development also challenged one of MakerHub’s core
assumptions, namely that makers were going to engage in the product development
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process. The design challenge demonstrated interest in aesthetic collaboration, but
MakerHub was less successful enticing makers into the physical building. This lack of
relational success coupled with MakerHub’s increasing profitability led to relationships
with external inputs becoming more symbolic rather than substantive.
However, Products Inc.’s new division reduced MakerHub’s need for sales and
marketing capabilities, causing a decrease in overall activities and a refocus on external
inputs. A key difference is the emphasis on stakeholder closeness (e.g. quality of
engagement) rather than overall quantity. This shift in focus is significant as previous
quotes, actions, and interpretations demonstrate that makers were not prevalent in the
ideation or building of products. Designers were the primary source of external input and
were utilized through design challenges.
Increased bureaucracy, increased risk aversion, and the lack of external input
generated a profit focused organization similar in many ways to Products Inc.’s R&D
centers. However, the recent founding of the new division may enable MakerHub to return
to its build-validate emphasis, generating more innovative products. Also, MakerHub’s
renewed efforts to foster high-quality engagements with key stakeholders in the
development process may increase the speed through which MakerHub can build and
validate.
Overall Outcomes: Given MakerHub’s resource constraints, an innovation focused
system would likely only survive if commercial activities were executed elsewhere and
different metrics were used to evaluate MakerHub’s output. Innovation is messy and
unpredictable. Metrics such as developing 12 products a year or financially breaking-even
are inherent contradictions to developing innovative products, particularly if products
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require advanced technological development. The new division enables this type of
innovation focus. However, an innovation focused system also requires a key change in
rationalizing successes and failures, a change from corporate and professional logics back
to a startup logic. Otherwise, an organization focused on developing innovative products
will be little different than Products Inc.’s current R&D Centers.
As describe throughout this study, a profit focused system governed much of
MakerHub’s decisions post-Product 3’s development. To satisfy the break-even and 12
products-a-year metrics, MakerHub pursued accessory products that were profitable,
quickly produced, and low risk. A combination of corporate and professional logics meant
protocols were developed to enable efficiency, safety, and avoidance of future mistakes.
However, when MakerHub was driven by a profit motive, concerns were raised over its
contribution to Products Inc. Profits were never MakerHub’s purpose as the initial goal and
logic driving MakerHub’s design was to validate innovative product ideas.
Benefits and Drawbacks for MakerHub Existing
Benefits. In many ways, MakerHub evolved away from its startup logics and initial mission
to embrace risk by failing-fast and creating radically innovative products through maker
engagement. Product 3’s success necessitated bureaucratizing MakerHub. Product 4’s
failure exacerbated the new leadership coalition’s reliance on professional and corporate
logics, which consequently led to an increase on learning from failure rather than
embracing its founding notion of failing fast and moving on. The increased emphasis on
process learning further increased bureaucracy. There are, however, a number of important
ways in which MakerHub still helps contribute to Products Inc.
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First, MakerHub is a physical place in which innovative ideas can occur and be
prototyped. MakerHub recently hosted a Products Inc. hackathon for Products Inc.
engineers (2019-2-21_O). This nuanced type of internal “innovation tournament” is
consistent with other recent strategies large corporations are undertaking to maximize
employee innovation (Tersiesch & Ulrich, 2009). Moreover, MakerHub is getting
progressively better at identifying the types of individuals who are most useful in
developing truly innovative ideas and the means through which to engage those
individuals. MakerHub’s development of internal (employee hackathons) and external
(events or practices targeted to specific groups) mechanisms designed to capture high
quality, innovative ideas and expertise is forward looking, particularly within its own
industry.
Second, MakerHub small batch manufacturing capabilities are beneficial to
Products Inc. Like auto manufacturers, Products Inc.’s facilities are designed for producing
thousands of units. MakerHub’s small batch manufacturing capabilities enable
customization, design changes, and product “hacking” without shutting down large scale
operations. Such capabilities are particularly useful when questions are raised about how a
product might modified or enhanced with additional features. MakerHub can “slap”
something together to quickly “see if it works” and discover what potential problems may
arise in larger scale operations.
A third way in which MakerHub benefits Products Inc. is by developing different
mechanisms for engaging with consumers and their opinions, particularly around product
desirability and product features. Surveys are as easy as “thumbs up or thumbs down” type
questions on Facebook. MakerHub is constantly experimenting on how to better engage
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with consumers and reduce the potential barriers (time, access, complexity) for consumers
to engage with them. These experiments are important as consumer engagement and
feedback are problems many corporations are attempting to figure out.
Finally, MakerHub benefits Products Inc. by serving as a mechanism for good will
and external engagement. Whereas Product Inc.’s imposing corporate campus is
inaccessible to the community, MakerHub is a friendly environment in which enthusiasts,
makers, or consumers can engage. Large corporations’ brand image is become increasing
known through social media, which has led to digital strategies to appear friendly or
innovative. MakerHub generates a wonderful external image for Products Inc., which is
further demonstrated by the amount of positive press both locally and nationally.
Drawbacks. Part of MakerHub’s founding stipulation with Products Inc. was that it would
pay for itself. Product 3’s success enabled several years of operating in the black; however,
other products have not attained the same level of success. Highly innovative products are
inherently risky; therefore, how will MakerHub financially sustain itself, particularly if its
most successful products are sold through Products Inc. new division? If MakerHub is not
able to demonstrate that increased closeness with stakeholders generates innovative
product ideas and increases speed through the product validation process, then MakerHub
may merely become an expensive R&D center, providing intangible benefits to the
community (open makerspace symbolic of community’s innovation) and a physical
environment for Products Inc.’s employees to quickly “hack” an idea.
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5. DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I articulate the theoretical contributions of this study, practical
implications, areas for future research, limitations, and offer a conclusion.
Theoretical Contributions
This study makes several contributions. First, Products Inc.’s attempt to respond to
market pressures by launching MakerHub provides insights into how ventures founded to
be dissimilar from the parent form and evolve. Past research demonstrates firms can evolve
for many reasons, including external pressures and managerial changes among others
(Greenwood et al., 2011). Less research examines the impact product outcomes have on
the formation, development, and evolution of firm logics. MakerHub’s story contributes to
our understanding (of the phenomenon) by demonstrating how success (Product 3),
necessity (production capabilities for Product 3), failure (Product 4), and an exogenous
shock (new division) may interact to produce a new ordering of logics that differs from
that at founding and more similar to what is familiar (e.g. Products Inc.’s R&D Centers).
These findings suggest both firms’ need for additional logics and rationalization of
incumbent logics may evolve in both intended and unintended ways.
Related to the first, this study’s second contribution suggests a cluster of competing
logics may act as both structural constraints and agency enablers as outputs or needs vary,
causing logics’ salience to ebb and flow. Although a few studies examine the microprocesses demonstrating firms’ and individuals’ responses to competing logics (Smets et
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al., 2012), little is known about how individuals respond within new ventures. MakerHub’s
story highlights the constraining role of certain logics vis-a-vis the enabling function of
still other logics within a new venture. Product 3’s unexpected success combined with
Products Inc.’s lack of ability to take on Product 3 “forced” MakerHub to adopt a logic
which could enable maximum performance (corporate logic). Adopting a corporate logic
subsequently focused MakerHub’s resources, constraining its ability to maintain startup
logics. When Products Inc. launched a new division, the need for a corporate logic
decreased. Although MakerHub retains aspects of a corporate logic, maximizing product
exposure (e.g. marketing spending) is no longer emphasized. In this study, four logics are
apparent within MakerHub and their competing prescriptions are demonstrated through the
negotiations between and actions by employees and management. As MakerHub evolved,
developed capabilities, and increased its bureaucracy, competing prescriptions generated a
reordering of logics. However, all four logics remained as MakerHub continued to satisfy
each of its distinct stakeholder groups.
MakerHub retained all four logics by utilizing key phrases broadly thereby
compartmentalizing certain logics through “symbolic commitment” (Greenwood et al.,
2011, p. 30). For example, over time “co-create” and “community” became allencompassing words that could mean any engagement at any stage in the product
development process. Therefore, MakerHub could emphasize both its community logic and
corporate logic simultaneously without making an explicit tradeoff. Through maintaining
a certain level of ambiguity, MakerHub retained the identities diverse stakeholder groups
wanted it to have.
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This study’s third contribution relates to how rationalizing past actions and
outcomes impact product development decisions, particularly depending on the
management’s risk averse tendencies. Logics not only prescribe action, but also serve to
make sense of what, how, and why outcomes occur. My findings suggest greater nuance in
how logics are negotiated, sustained, and replaced even when firm outcomes are internally
consistent with the incumbent set of logics’ prescriptions. In other words, even when ‘what,
how, and why’ were consistently explained within the startup logic rationalization, that
logic was replaced in exchange for a more comfortable known logic. For example, whereas
a startup logic was used to rationalize Product 1 and 2’s success, a corporate logic formed
both the strategy for Product 3 and rationalized its success. Conversely, a professional logic
rationalized Product 4’s failure, increasing risk aversion tendencies and generating
significant rippling effects for future decision making. This suggests a logic may
sufficiently explain outcomes yet still be replaced.
Fourth, this study contributes to the growing theoretical interest in makerspaces and
further explores one makerspace’s practical impact. Recent scholarship (Browder et al.,
2019) theorizes “knowledge creation and sharing spaces constitute the central features of
the maker movement, creating resource combinations that makers can use for project
execution, expansion, and—in some cases—commercialization.” MakerHub assumed its
location, openness, and advanced fabrication capabilities would attract makers intent on
commercial outcomes into its physical environment, generating innovative ideas between
employees and individuals. With the exception of students working on class projects or
Products Inc. employees, very few makers utilize use MakerHub’s technology or tools.
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MakerHub is an open innovation organization. As noted earlier, open innovation is
not a silver bullet for companies. Birkinshaw et al. (2011) warn companies are actually
much better at internally generating innovative ideas than they are at selecting, developing,
or diffusing those ideas. Moreover, they certify, “online tools, open innovation
communities and big collaborative forums all have their limitations. None is always right
or always wrong. The best approach involves careful judgment and a deep understanding
of the particular challenges a company is facing” (Birkinshaw et al., 2011, p. 8). This study
provides additional data to the conversation regarding what types of innovations corporate
venture makerspaces actually generate. MakerHub’s innovative product ideas were
generated internally; however, MakerHub had two sources of incremental innovations
which were often more similar to the concept of “hacking” (a key element within the maker
movement). MakerHub’s hacks are derived from two sources: 1) customers hacking addon solutions to products at home (e.g. increased capacity add-on to Product 3, probe
incorporated for Product 2), and 2) MakerHub engineers hacking existing appliances,
enabling unique applications (e.g. adding a credit card system to a large appliance).
Browder and colleagues (2019) also question the extent to which external labor
benefits from engaging with corporations on various projects. MakerHub navigates these
potentially challenging waters by often celebrating consumer engagement through social
media recognition. As the products being hacked by consumers are generally low tech and
inexpensive, recognition appears sufficient as little resistance or objection is raised.
Practical Implications
There are several practical implications of the present study. First, a corporate
venture makerspace offers a new environment in which to study innovation, corporate
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entrepreneurship, and product development. I hope my work offers insights for
corporations wanting to develop innovative organizational designs with environments
distinct from “corporate culture.” The notions of physical environment, cognitive scope,
relational access, and cultural norms can be used as a means to create broad categories in
which to clearly differentiate how an environment may be created distinct.
A second implication for practitioners is the way in which MakerHub responds as
new products flourish or flounder. Both successful and unsuccessful products impact the
venture, particularly on firm bureaucracy and organizational outcomes. Successful
products necessitate processes to enable the manufacturing, selling, and servicing of
products and customers. Such processes can increase bureaucracy, which tends to slow
organizations down. Moreover, if products are successful but the firm does not increase
human capital, resources may become spread too thinly also decreasing the time and
resources necessary to ideate and validate new product ideas. Similarly, unsuccessful
products can also increase bureaucracy as management implements new processes to avoid
failure in the future. As demonstrated in the case of MakerHub, “management got PTSD”
from the failure of Product 4 instead of celebrating having learned something and moving
on. Developing such a risk accepting environment may prove challenging, particularly for
professional disciplines that emphasize safety and efficiency (e.g. engineering).
As a third practical implication, this study provides an example of a corporate
venture navigating between corporate, community, and venture stakeholders. Over time,
MakerHub evolved in how it managed each of these relationships to both better serve its
own purpose as well as maintain value for its diverse set of stakeholder groups. MakerHub
accomplished this goal by emphasizing both the physical environment, bringing interested
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parties into the space, as well as by emphasizing its employees’ relational access, enabling
engagement with industry experts, makers, enthusiasts, and potential consumers.
Limitations
In this section, I discuss potential threats to external validity and limitations. First,
MakerHub’s environment is unique. The location of MakerHub results in human capital,
knowledge capital, and other resource constraints that are geographically specific. This
study took place in a midsized city in the south-central U.S. It is impossible to determine
whether the results of this study would be consistent with a study on either U.S. coast. A
second threat to external validity is that MakerHub is situation specific. Indeed, a limitation
of case study analysis is lack of generalizability given the small sample size, and in this
particular case, the sample size of 1. However, MakerHub is unique as it is the only
corporate venture makerspace I know of, making additional case studies of similar
organizational type firms impossible. Moreover, given both the intense national interest in
MakerHub (evidenced by publications in the Wall Street Journal, Harvard Business
Review and others) and the growing trend in large corporations to adopt innovative
strategies, MakerHub’s story is potentially relevant to a wide audience of firms and
managers. Although MakerHub’s environment is distinct from other firms, I contend
enough similarities exist to generate relevance to other firms and managers.
There are several limitations to the present study. For example, Products Inc. is in
the appliances industry. A corporate venture like MakerHub may not be as effective in a
more technologically driven industry or in one significantly less technologically driven.
Part of MakerHub’s appeal to both community members and customers is MakerHub’s
involvement in new technology development. However, if Products Inc. was in a
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technology industry (i.e. software), MakerHub might have had greater difficulty in
separating identities from the parent (Products Inc.). Conversely, if Products Inc. had no
technological component, MakerHub’s innovative processes might have been
underwhelming, causing stakeholders to dismiss the innovative aspects of MakerHub that
generates interest from internal and external stakeholders.
Lastly, a further limitation concerns the interviews conducted. I did not interview
current members of Products Inc. as this is not a comparative ethnography and many of the
MakerHub employees are former Products Inc. employees.
Future Research
With a few notable exceptions (Biniari et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 2015), very little
institutional logics research discusses the parent-venture relationship. There are number of
potential avenues for further study in this research stream. For example, when a parent
spawns a venture with a different logic, understanding the conditions under which the logic
remains or fades is significant. What types of hybrids generate the most successful
corporate ventures? Under what conditions do geographical distance between parent and
venture impact the likelihood of a founding set of logics remain or change? To what extent
does hiring non-corporate employees to run the venture impact founding logics? How
important are significant successes or significant failures in the likelihood a venture logic
stays? Are moderate product successes and moderate failures less causal in logic changes
or tensions than significant successes or failures? Such questions are potentially important
as firms continue to experiment with various organizational types in an effort to generate
sustainable innovation practices.
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A second area for future research concerns the relationship between employee and
institutional complexity. Past research highlights the impact changes in logics may have
on employee satisfaction (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). For example, one study discusses
the disillusionment that socially focused employees had when a social venture business
became more profit focused (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). In a different study, researchers
demonstrate how new hires were frustrated when they realized the firm logics presented to
them in interviews were different than the logics emphasized in everyday firm practices.
MakerHub provides a unique example. Even when logics shifted dramatically from startup
logics to corporate and professional logics, employees remained relatively happy.
Although some commercial employees became frustrated as MakerHub returned to a more
product development focus away from maximizing profits, even those employees enjoy
the overall environment and culture at MakerHub.
Conclusion
Although several of its founding assumptions were not realized—namely the level
of external maker engagement in generating innovative product ideas or the ability to
validate innovative products quickly—MakerHub’s past successes include several
profitable products, national recognition and attention, appreciation by many local
stakeholders, and multiple awards for best product in its category at major technology
conferences. MakerHub’s team is talented and enthusiastic. To date, however, MakerHub’s
greatest innovation is not one of its products. MakerHub’s greatest innovation is MakerHub
itself.

115

REFERENCES
Aldrich, H. E. (2014). The democratization of entrepreneurship? Hackers, makerspaces,
and crowdfunding. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of
Management.
Almandoz, J. (2014). Founding teams as carriers of competing logics: When institutional
forces predict banks’ risk exposure. Administrative science quarterly, 59(3), 442473.
Anderson, C. (2012). Makers: The New Industrial Revolution (2013) Crown Business.
New York.
Ashraf, N., Ahmadsimab, A., & Pinkse, J. (2017). From Animosity to Affinity: The
Interplay of Competing Logics and Interdependence in Cross‐Sector Partnerships.
Journal of Management Studies, 54(6), 793-822.
Babbie, E. (2015). The practice of social research: Nelson Education.
Baker, T., & Nelson, R. E. (2005). Creating something from nothing: Resource
construction through entrepreneurial bricolage. Administrative science quarterly,
50(3), 329-366.
Barley, S. R., & Tolbert, P. S. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the
links between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18(1), 93-117.
Barrett, T., Pizzico, M., Levy, B. D., Nagel, R. L., Linsey, J. S., Talley, K. G., . . .
Newstetter, W. C. (2015). A review of university maker spaces.
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of
commercial microfinance organizations. Academy of management journal, 53(6),
1419-1440.
Bertot, J. C., Real, B., Lee, J., McDermott, A. J., & Jaeger, P. T. (2015). 2014 Digital
Inclusion Survey: Survey Findings and Results: Information Policy & Access
Center, College of Information Studies, University of Maryland.
Bettis, R. A., & Hitt, M. A. (1995). The new competitive landscape. Strategic
Management Journal, 16(S1), 7-19.
Binder, A. (2007). For love and money: Organizations’ creative responses to multiple
environmental logics. Theory and society, 36(6), 547-571.
Biniari, M. G., Simmons, S. A., Monsen, E. W., & Moreno, M. P. (2015). The
configuration of corporate venturing logics: An integrated resource dependence
and institutional perspective. Small Business Economics, 45(2), 351-367.
Birkinshaw, J., Bouquet, C., & Barsoux, J.-L. (2011). The 5 myths of innovation. MIT
Sloan Management Review, 52(2), 43.
Black, L. J., Carlile, P. R., & Repenning, N. P. (2004). A dynamic theory of expertise and
occupational boundaries in new technology implementation: Building on Barley's
study of CT scanning. Administrative science quarterly, 49(4), 572-607.
Bowler, L. (2014). Creativity through" maker" experiences and design thinking in the
education of librarians. Knowledge Quest, 42(5), 58.

116

Brandl, J., & Bullinger, B. (2017). Individuals’ considerations when responding to
competing logics: Insights from identity control theory. Journal of Management
Inquiry, 26(2), 181-192.
Browder, R. E., Aldrich, H. E., & Bradley, S. W. (2019). The emergence of the maker
movement: Implications for entrepreneurship research. Journal of business
venturing.
Brown, B. (2015). Daring greatly: How the courage to be vulnerable transforms the way
we live, love, parent, and lead: Penguin.
Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1995). Product development: Past research, present
findings, and future directions. Academy of management review, 20(2), 343-378.
Canessa, E., Fonda, C., Zennaro, M., & Deadline, N. (2013). Low-‐cost 3D printing for
science, education and sustainable development. Low-Cost 3D Printing, 11.
Cavalcanti, G. (2013). Is it a Hackerspace, Makerspace, TechShop, or FabLab. Make,
May, 22.
Chesbrough, H. (2003). Open innovation: Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Chesbrough, H. (2006a). The era of open innovation. Managing innovation and change,
127(3), 34-41.
Chesbrough, H. (2006b). Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting
from technology: Harvard Business Press.
Chesbrough, H. (2012). Open innovation: Where we've been and where we're going.
Research-Technology Management, 55(4), 20-27.
Christians, C. G., & Carey, J. W. (1989). The logic and aims of qualitative research.
Research methods in mass communication, 354-374.
Colegrove, T. (2013). Editorial board thoughts: libraries as makerspace? Information
Technology and Libraries (Online), 32(1), 2.
Covin, J. G., & Miles, M. P. (2007). Strategic use of corporate venturing.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31(2), 183-207.
Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry.
Theory into practice, 39(3), 124-130.
Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2017). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing
among five approaches: Sage publications.
Cross, A. (2017). Tinkering in k-12: an exploratory mixed methods study of makerspaces
in schools as an application of constructivist learning: Pepperdine University.
Currie, G., & Spyridonidis, D. (2016). Interpretation of multiple institutional logics on
the ground: Actors’ position, their agency and situational constraints in
professionalized contexts. Organization Studies, 37(1), 77-97.
Curry, R. (2017). Makerspaces: a beneficial new service for academic libraries? Library
Review, 66(4/5), 201-212.
Dacin, M. T., Munir, K., & Tracey, P. (2010). Formal dining at Cambridge colleges:
Linking ritual performance and institutional maintenance. Academy of
management journal, 53(6), 1393-1418.
Dalpiaz, E., Rindova, V., & Ravasi, D. (2016). Combining logics to transform
organizational agency: Blending industry and art at Alessi. Administrative science
quarterly, 61(3), 347-392.

117

Damanpour, F., & Wischnevsky, J. D. (2006). Research on innovation in organizations:
Distinguishing innovation-generating from innovation-adopting organizations.
Journal of engineering and technology management, 23(4), 269-291.
Davidsson, P. (2004). Researching entrepreneurship: Springer.
Davidsson, P. (2016). Researching entrepreneurship: conceptualization and design:
Springer.
Davis, D. G. (2017). Novice Behavior in a Makerspace: Pragmatic Pathways to Shaping
CS Identity. The University of Texas at San Antonio.
Davis, G. F., & Marquis, C. (2005). Prospects for organization theory in the early twentyfirst century: Institutional fields and mechanisms. Organization Science, 16(4),
332-343.
Delbridge, R., & Edwards, T. (2013). Inhabiting institutions: Critical realist refinements
to understanding institutional complexity and change. Organization Studies,
34(7), 927-947.
Demetry, D. A. (2015). Episodic Organizations: Pop-up and Underground Restaurants
and the Temporality of Organizational Life. Northwestern University.
DeRosa, M. S. (2016). Let the wild rumpus start!: fostering creative thinking and
expression among diverse learners through a makerspace in an international
school in China.
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and Agency
DiMaggio, P. J. (1991). Constructing an organizational field as a professional project: US
art museums, 1920-1940. The new institutionalism in organizational analysis,
267, 292.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Collective rationality
and institutional isomorphism in organizational fields. American Sociological
Review, 48(2), 147-160.
Dimov, D. (2007). Beyond the single‐person, single‐insight attribution in understanding
entrepreneurial opportunities. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31(5), 713731.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. (1996). Resource-based view of strategic
alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms.
Organization Science, 7(2), 136-150.
Fiet, J. O. (1996). The informational basis of entrepreneurial discovery. Small Business
Economics, 8(6), 419-430.
Fiet, J. O. (2007). A prescriptive analysis of search and discovery. Journal of
Management Studies, 44(4), 592-611.
Fjeldstad, Ø. D., Snow, C. C., Miles, R. E., & Lettl, C. (2012). The architecture of
collaboration. Strategic Management Journal, 33(6), 734-750.
Fleming, L. (2015). Worlds of making: Best practices for establishing a makerspace for
your school: Corwin Press.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices and
institutional contradictions.
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures (Vol. 5019): Basic books.
Goodrick, E., & Salancik, G. R. (1996). Organizational discretion in responding to
institutional practices: Hospitals and cesarean births. Administrative science
quarterly, 1-28.
118

Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011).
Institutional complexity and organizational responses. Academy of Management
annals, 5(1), 317-371.
Gross, N. (2009). A pragmatist theory of social mechanisms. American Sociological
Review, 74(3), 358-379.
Guba, E. G. (1990). The paradigm dialog: Sage publications.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a
reflection of its top managers. Academy of management review, 9(2), 193-206.
Hamilton, A., & Gioia, D. A. (2009). Fostering sustainability-focused organizational
identities. Exploring positive identities and organizations: Building a theoretical
and research foundation, 427-451.
Hanushek, E. A. (1996). Measuring investment in education. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 10(4), 9-30.
Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2008). Institutional entrepreneurship. The Sage handbook of
organizational institutionalism, 1, 198-217.
Harel, I. E., & Papert, S. E. (1991). Constructionism: Ablex Publishing.
Hargadon, A. B., & Douglas, Y. (2001). When innovations meet institutions: Edison and
the design of the electric light. Administrative science quarterly, 46(3), 476-501.
Hargadon, A. B., & Sutton, R. I. (1997). Technology brokering and innovation in a
product development firm. Administrative science quarterly, 716-749.
Hatch, M. (2013). The maker movement manifesto: rules for innovation in the new world
of crafters, hackers, and tinkerers: McGraw Hill Professional.
Haugen, J. (2015). Stakeholder Voices in Integrating Experiential Education as a
Strategic University Initiative. University of Kansas.
Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. (1997). Structuring a theory of moral sentiments:
Institutional and organizational coevolution in the early thrift industry. American
journal of Sociology, 102(6), 1606-1651.
Hedges, L. V., & Greenwald, R. (1996). Have times changed? The relation between
school resources and student performance. Does money matter? The effect of
school resources on student achievement and adult success, 74-92.
Hirsch, P. M., & Lounsbury, M. (1997). Ending the family quarrel: Toward a
reconciliation of “old” and “new” institutionalisms. American behavioral
scientist, 40(4), 406-418.
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Grossman, W. (2002). Conflicting
voices: The effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal
governance on corporate innovation strategies. Academy of management journal,
45(4), 697-716.
Ito, J., & Howe, J. (2016). Whiplash: How to survive our faster future: Hachette UK.
Jain, S., & Sharma, D. (2013). Institutional logic migration and industry evolution in
emerging economies: The case of telephony in India. Strategic Entrepreneurship
Journal, 7(3), 252-271.
Karakaya, F., & Kobu, B. (1994). New product development process: An investigation of
success and failure in high-technology and non-high-technology firms. Journal of
business venturing, 9(1), 49-66.

119

Kiss, A. N., & Barr, P. S. (2017). New product development strategy implementation
duration and new venture performance: A contingency-based perspective. Journal
of Management, 43(4), 1185-1210.
Kolb, D. A. (2014). Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and
development: FT press.
Kraatz, M. S. (1998). Learning by association? Interorganizational networks and
adaptation to environmental change. Academy of management journal, 41(6),
621-643.
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. (2008). Organizational implications of institutional
pluralism. The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, 840, 243-275.
Lacy, J. E. (2016). A Case Study of a High School Fab Lab: The University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
Lahana, L. I. (2016). The tech café, a social action makerspace: Middle school students
as change agents. Teachers College, Columbia University.
Leca, B., & Naccache, P. (2006). A critical realist approach to institutional
entrepreneurship. Organization, 13(5), 627-651.
Lips, D., Watkins, S. J., & Fleming, J. (2008). Does Spending More on Education
Improve Academic Achievement? Backgrounder. No. 2179. Heritage
Foundation.
Litts, B. K. (2015). Making learning: Makerspaces as learning environments. The
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Lo, J. Y.-C., & Kennedy, M. T. (2014). Approval in nanotechnology patents: Micro and
macro factors that affect reactions to category blending. Organization Science,
26(1), 119-139.
Lok, J. (2010). Institutional logics as identity projects. Academy of management journal,
53(6), 1305-1335.
Lounsbury, M. (2002). Institutional transformation and status mobility: The
professionalization of the field of finance. Academy of management journal,
45(1), 255-266.
Lounsbury, M., & Beckman, C. M. (2015). Celebrating organization theory. Journal of
Management Studies, 52(2), 288-308.
Lucas, K., Kerrick, S. A., Haugen, J., & Crider, C. J. (2016). Communicating
Entrepreneurial Passion: Personal Passion vs. Perceived Passion in Venture
Pitches. IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, 59(4), 363-378.
Mair, J., Mayer, J., & Lutz, E. (2015). Navigating institutional plurality: Organizational
governance in hybrid organizations. Organization Studies, 36(6), 713-739.
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning.
Organization Science, 2(1), 71-87.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2010). Rediscovering institutions: Simon and Schuster.
Martin, G., Currie, G., Weaver, S., Finn, R., & McDonald, R. (2017). Institutional
complexity and individual responses: delineating the boundaries of partial
autonomy. Organization Studies, 38(1), 103-127.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as
myth and ceremony. American journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340-363.
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldana, J. (2013). Qualitative Data Analysis: A
Methods Sourcebook: Sage.
120

Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Amore, M. D., Minichilli, A., & Corbetta, G. (2017).
Institutional logics, family firm governance and performance. Journal of business
venturing, 32(6), 674-693.
Milosevic, I. (2014). Understanding adaptive culture: Exploring the role of symbols in
the emergence of innovative solutions in a marketing firm.
Mitchell, R. J., Shepherd, D. A., & Sharfman, M. P. (2011). Erratic strategic decisions:
when and why managers are inconsistent in strategic decision making. Strategic
Management Journal, 32(7), 683-704.
Mitchell, R. K., Busenitz, L., Lant, T., McDougall, P. P., Morse, E. A., & Smith, J. B.
(2002). Toward a theory of entrepreneurial cognition: Rethinking the people side
of entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(2), 93104.
O'Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. (2013). Organizational ambidexterity: Past, present,
and future. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 27(4), 324-338.
Oliver, K. M. (2016). Professional development considerations for makerspace leaders,
part one: Addressing “what?” and “why?”. TechTrends, 60(2), 160-166.
Özen, Ş., & Akkemik, K. A. (2012). Does Illegitimate Corporate Behaviour Follow the
Forms of Polity? The Turkish Experience. Journal of Management Studies, 49(3),
515-537.
Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2010). When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of
management review, 35(3), 455-476.
Pahnke, E. C., Katila, R., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2015). Who takes you to the dance? How
partners’ institutional logics influence innovation in young firms. Administrative
science quarterly, 60(4), 596-633.
Pallas, J., Fredriksson, M., & Wedlin, L. (2016). Translating institutional logics: When
the media logic meets professions. Organization Studies, 37(11), 1661-1684.
Peppler, K., Halverson, E., & Kafai, Y. B. (2016a). Makeology: Makerspaces as learning
environments (Vol. 1): Routledge.
Peppler, K., Halverson, E. R., & Kafai, Y. B. (2016b). Makeology: Makers as learners
(Vol. 2): Routledge.
Perlow, L. A., Okhuysen, G. A., & Repenning, N. P. (2002). The speed trap: Exploring
the relationship between decision making and temporal context. Academy of
management journal, 45(5), 931-955.
Petrich, M., Wilkinson, K., & Bevan, B. (2013). It looks like fun, but are they learning.
Design, make, play: Growing the next generation of STEM innovators, 50-70.
Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy.
Provenzano, N. (2016). Your starter guide to makerspaces: Create Space Independent
Publishing.
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. (2003). Institutional change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle
cuisine as an identity movement in French gastronomy. American journal of
Sociology, 108(4), 795-843.
Reay, T., & Jones, C. (2016). Qualitatively capturing institutional logics. Strategic
Organization, 14(4), 441-454.
Robinson, W. T. (1990). Product innovation and start-up business market share
performance. Management science, 36(10), 1279-1289.
121

Sarasvathy, S. D. (2001). Causation and effectuation: Toward a theoretical shift from
economic inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency. Academy of management
review, 26(2), 243-263.
Sauermann, H., & Stephan, P. (2013). Conflicting logics? A multidimensional view of
industrial and academic science. Organization Science, 24(3), 889-909.
Sawyer, R. K. (2011). Explaining creativity: The science of human innovation: Oxford
University Press.
Schildt, H., & Perkmann, M. (2017). Organizational settlements: Theorizing how
organizations respond to institutional complexity. Journal of Management
Inquiry, 26(2), 139-145.
Selznick, P. (1949). TVA and the Grass Roots.
Selznick, P. (1996). Institutionalism" old" and" new". Administrative science quarterly,
270-277.
Selznick, P. (2011). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation: Quid
Pro Books.
Shane, S. (2000). Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities.
Organization Science, 11(4), 448-469.
Shepherd, D. A., & DeTienne, D. R. (2005). Prior knowledge, potential financial reward,
and opportunity identification. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(1), 91112.
Simon, H. A. (2013). Administrative behavior: Simon and Schuster.
Smets, M., Morris, T., & Greenwood, R. (2012). From practice to field: A multilevel
model of practice-driven institutional change. Academy of management journal,
55(4), 877-904.
Smith, L. G., Gillespie, N., Callan, V. J., Fitzsimmons, T. W., & Paulsen, N. (2017).
Injunctive and descriptive logics during newcomer socialization: The impact on
organizational identification, trustworthiness, and self‐efficacy. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 38(4), 487-511.
Souitaris, V., & Maestro, B. (2010). Polychronicity in top management teams: The
impact on strategic decision processes and performance of new technology
ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 31(6), 652-678.
Srivastava, P., & Hopwood, N. (2009). A practical iterative framework for qualitative
data analysis. International journal of qualitative methods, 8(1), 76-84.
Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business dynamics: systems thinking and modeling for a complex
world.
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy.
Administrative science quarterly, 50(1), 35-67.
Thorén, C., Ågerfalk, P. J., & Rolandsson, B. (2017). Voicing the Puppet:
Accommodating Unresolved Institutional Tensions in Digital Open Practices.
Organization Studies, 0170840617695358.
Thornton, P. H. (2002). The rise of the corporation in a craft industry: Conflict and
conformity in institutional logics. Academy of management journal, 45(1), 81101.
Thornton, P. H. (2004). Markets from culture: Institutional logics and organizational
decisions in higher education publishing: Stanford University Press.

122

Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency
of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education
publishing industry, 1958–1990. American journal of Sociology, 105(3), 801-843.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., & Suddaby, R. (2008). The Sage
handbook of organizational institutionalism. Institutional logics.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics
perspective: A new approach to culture, structure, and process: Oxford
University Press on Demand.
Tracy, S. J. (2012). Qualitative research methods: Collecting evidence, crafting analysis,
communicating impact: John Wiley & Sons.
Tushman, M. L., & O'Reilly III, C. A. (1996). Ambidextrous organizations: Managing
evolutionary and revolutionary change. California Management Review, 38(4), 829.
van Holm, E. (2014). What are makerspaces, hackerspaces, and fab labs?
Van Maanen, J. (1979). The fact of fiction in organizational ethnography. Administrative
science quarterly, 24(4), 539-550.
Vasudeva, G., Zaheer, A., & Hernandez, E. (2013). The embeddedness of networks:
Institutions, structural holes, and innovativeness in the fuel cell industry.
Organization Science, 24(3), 645-663.
Villani, E., Greco, L., & Phillips, N. (2017). Understanding Value Creation in Public‐
Private Partnerships: A Comparative Case Study. Journal of Management Studies,
54(6), 876-905.
Weick, K. E. (1979). The social psychology of organizing (Topics in social psychology
series). Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill Humanities.
Westphal, J. D., Gulati, R., & Shortell, S. M. (1997). Customization or conformity? An
institutional and network perspective on the content and consequences of TQM
adoption. Administrative science quarterly, 366-394.
Yang, T., & Aldrich, H. E. (2017). “The liability of newness” revisited: Theoretical
restatement and empirical testing in emergent organizations. Social Science
Research, 63, 36-53.
Zhao, E. Y., & Lounsbury, M. (2016). An institutional logics approach to social
entrepreneurship: Market logic, religious diversity, and resource acquisition by
microfinance organizations. Journal of business venturing, 31(6), 643-662.
Zucker, L. G. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American
Sociological Review, 726-743.

123

APPENDIX
Warm up/ Generative Questions
1. Why did you come to MakerHub?
2. Tell me about your favorite project at MakerHub.
Fundamental Assumption
3. Before asking my other questions, I would like to confirm your understanding of
MakerHub’s mission and strategy. I will state my understanding, please correct
me if you think I am wrong.
MakerHub was designed to (A) quickly prototype never-seen-before products by
(B) engaging with the community through drawing on their ideas and feedback,
(C) being separate from Products Inc. so that MakerHub could be more free to
prototype innovative product ideas, but (D) to still be a part of Products Inc., so
that you could manufacture and develop profitable innovations. Is that correct?
a. If yes, Thank you, I would like to ask you about each element of this
mission and strategy. The questions are designed to examine how each
element of this strategy interacts with each other element, as thoroughly as
possible. Therefore, some parts may seem highly detailed or may seem to
overlap with other parts. Thus, if you feel like you have nothing to say in
response to a given question that is fine. Please just let me know and we
will move on to the next question.
b. If no, ask for clarification and changes. Adapt the subsequent questions
accordingly.
Community Engagement
4. In your past experience, what have been some activities you do to engage the
community?
5. How do these community activities influence your ability to prototype innovative
product ideas?
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your community related
activities help or hinder your ability to prototype innovative product ideas
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely
helped

6. How do these community related activities influence MakerHub’s or Products
Inc.’s ability to manufacture and sell new products?
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Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your community related
activities help or hinder MakerHub’s or Products Inc.’s ability to manufacture and sell
new products.
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely
helped

Internal Activities that Enable/Constrain
7. In your past experience, what have been some activities you have done to
prototype innovative product ideas?
8. How do these activities to prototype innovative product ideas influence
MakerHub’s or Products Inc.’s ability to manufacture and sell new products?
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to
prototype innovative product ideas help or hinder MakerHub’s or Products Inc.’s ability
to manufacture and sell new products.
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely
helped

9. How do these activities you do to prototype innovative product ideas influence
how you interact with the community?
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to
prototype innovative product ideas help or hinder your ability to engage with the
community
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely
helped

10. In your past experience, what are some activities you do at MakerHub to
manufacture products and make money?
11. How do these activities to manufacture products and make money influence your
ability to interact with the community?
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to
manufacture products and make money help or hinder your ability to interact with the
community.
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely
helped

12. How do these activities you do to manufacture products and make money
influence your ability to prototype innovative product ideas?
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to
manufacture products and make money help or hinder your ability to prototype
innovative product ideas
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(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely
helped

Triangulation/Validation Question
13. I will show interviewees the list of activities generated from my field notes, and
my ideas about how they would answer the questions above, given the field notes.
I will ask interviewees to respond to both the activities listed and then state what
they agree with, what they disagree with, and why they agree or disagree.
MakerHub in the Future Questions
14. Where do you think MakerHub will be in 5 years?
15. What do you hope MakerHub looks like in 5 years
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